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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of duress is common to other bodies of law, but the
application of the duress doctrine is both unclear and highly unstable in
immigration law. Outside of immigration law, a person who commits a
criminal act out of well-placed fear of terrible consequences is different
than a person who willingly commits a crime, but American immigration
law does not recognize this difference. The lack of clarity leads to certain
absurd results and demands reimagining, redefinition, and an unequivocal
statement of the significance of duress in ascertaining culpability. While
there are inevitably some difficult lines to be drawn in any definition or
application of the doctrine, as a general matter, it is well established
everywhere but in immigration law that varying levels of culpability exist
and that those variations matter.1
Consider the story of a teenaged girl, Ana,2 who moves in with her
boyfriend after being cast out by her parents. The boyfriend turns
physically and sexually abusive, and when Ana tries to run away, he finds
her and brings her back, deepening his control over her. He then forces her
to carry drugs for him by letting her know he will rape her if she refuses.
This is an ugly story, but one that lawyers who work with immigrants
know well, in infinite variations of the basic narrative. It is also a story
that, even in this general formulation, meets globally accepted elements of
the duress defense:3 an imminent, credible threat of serious consequences,
where the person has no reasonable opportunity to escape.
1. See discussion of this disparity infra Part I.
2. This is a lightly fictionalized story of one of my pro bono clients whom I have been
representing for more than five years because her case has been made needlessly complex and
contentious due to the legal issues identified in this Article. Indeed, the injustices of her case form the
core inspiration for this Article.
3. See discussion on various contexts infra Part I.
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As this Article proceeds, we will see how Ana’s story reveals how
disjointed the application of duress is, not just within U.S. immigration
law but between U.S. immigration law and the criminal and international
laws whose landscapes are so much more richly theorized. The Article
will, in Part I, define the duress doctrine and its philosophical and policy
underpinnings in United States criminal law and in international criminal
and refugee law. While there are variations within these bodies of law,
they share a degree of commonality that is remarkable considering the
differences in their domains. Part II.A will turn to the role and position
of duress doctrine in immigration law, specifically in these contexts:
human trafficking, crimmigration,4 grounds of inadmissibility and
deportability, and denaturalization proceedings. This range of approaches
provides the background and contrast for the discussion of duress in
asylum law in Part II.B.
But Ana’s story helps us see the need for these comparisons. Let us
use this basic story as a prism for viewing the morass of conflicting
treatments of duress in immigration law. If the story happened within the
United States, two things might happen. First, if arrested for carrying
drugs, Ana would be able to avail herself of the duress defense in her
criminal proceeding in both the prosecution phase and the sentencing
phase. In the prosecution phase, proof of duress could remove the mens
rea requirement for Ana, depending upon the particular statute used to
charge her.5 If she is convicted, duress would be a factor mitigating any
possible sentence. In either case, the existence of duress either makes a
conviction less likely at all or reduces its impacts—which will be very
important to whether the government would seek to remove Ana.
But perhaps there is no criminal prosecution because the prosecutor
realizes Ana is more a victim than a perpetrator or because the conduct of
carrying drugs never comes to light. Ana could also use these basic facts
to seek a visa as a victim of a severe form of human trafficking; that visa
would place her on a path to a green card and citizenship.6 The same facts
of coercion and duress that reduce her culpability in the criminal legal
system form the basis of meeting that trafficking victim definition 7
4. “Crimmigration” is a term coined by Professor Juliet Stumpf to encompass the myriad ways
that the criminal legal system and immigration laws intersect. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 377 (2006); see, e.g., Tanvi
Misra, The Rise of ‘Crimmigration,’ BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-16/c-sar-garc-a-hern-ndez-on-the-rise-ofcrimmigration [https://perma.cc/9A8M-FKML]. The term has since become widely used in the field
of immigration law.
5. See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
6. See INA § 101(a)(15)(T); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T).
7. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7102(11). The
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act defines severe forms of trafficking as
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because she has been obtained and used, coercively, for the purpose of
involuntary servitude (the drug-carrying but potentially also to provide
sex). The fact that her labor (carrying drugs) is illegal is beside the
point—indeed, another segment of trafficking law is devoted entirely to
coerced sex work, and sex work is criminalized in almost all American
states.8 The trafficking law recognizes her as a victim and is in sync with
how the criminal legal system understands her reduced, or nonexistent,
complicity in the conduct.
However, let us imagine Ana’s story happened in Colombia, and her
abuser was a member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC). To simplify the case for the purposes of this Article,9 let us
assume Ana is Afro-Colombian, and race is one demonstrated reason for
his abuse of her. First, Ana applies for a visa. Let us assume time has
passed, she escaped her abuser and founded a business, and she now wants
to travel to California to meet with a prospective client. She applies for a
business visitor visa and qualifies for it except she is inadmissible 10
because she has provided “material support” to terrorists (the FARC), by
carrying the drugs for her abuser.11 The terrorism grounds of
inadmissibility are notably broad, and even the most minimal actions count
as impermissible material support.12 There is no duress exception to the
material support bar, so Ana will not be issued the visa. Although she may

(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion,
or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or (B)
the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or
services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.
Id.
8. US Federal and State Prostitution Laws and Related Punishments, BRITANNICA PROCON.ORG
(May 4, 2018), https://prostitution.procon.org/us-federal-and-state-prostitution-laws-and-relatedpunishments [https://perma.cc/D7UU-VMTW].
9. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). Asylum cases based upon gender and
gender-based violence are in a state of heightened contest and uncertainty in the wake of the Attorney
General’s controversial decision.
10. See INA § 101(a)(15); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (for “nonimmigrant” visitors definition);
INA § 203; 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (for lawful permanent residents definition). Inadmissibility is a significant
concept in immigration law. Someone must both fit within a visa category and be admissible.
In this hypothetical, Ana qualifies for a nonimmigrant visa under INA § 101(a)(15)(B);
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B). But the immigration law prevents people from coming to the country for
a host of reasons set, forth in INA § 212; 8 U.S.C. § 1182, from criminal offense to likelihood of
becoming a public charge to involvement in terrorist activity—the last of which is at issue in this
hypothetical.
11. See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).
12. See INA § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv); see also Matter of A-C-M-, 27
I. & N. Dec. 303 (B.I.A. 2018) (holding that even de minimis support falls within this bar to
admissibility).
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apply for a waiver of that ground of inadmissibility, that waiver is entirely
discretionary and is granted rarely.13
Or perhaps Ana escaped from her abuse and made her way to the
United States, where she applies for asylum, and her facts meet the
requirements for asylum.14 She has a well-founded fear of persecution (in
her case rape, beatings, and perhaps death) at the hands of her abuser on
account of her race, and her abuser is someone the Colombian government
cannot control. She qualifies for asylum—except that, in carrying the
drugs for him, she has perhaps committed a serious nonpolitical crime,
which is a bar to protection under our asylum law. The government’s
position is that there is no duress exception to this bar, and if that position
holds, the same duress that would have qualified Ana for immigration
benefits in the previous paragraph makes her ineligible for immigration
protection now.15
In the criminal system, duress, at least, mitigates Ana’s culpability.
It could provide the basis for a special human trafficking visa or support a
waiver of the terrorism bar to her admission to the United States. But the
government would ignore duress in the asylum context, putting asylum out
of reach. How could the same set of facts yield such absurdly different
results? As the Immigration and Nationality Act has absorbed laws and
priorities from different directions over the years,16 it has done so without
any conceptual harmony, and the diversity of treatments of duress reflect
that disjointedness. These absurdly different results undermine confidence
in the law. It is also out of step with other domestic and international
understandings of the role duress plays in criminal culpability.
U.S. criminal law has long recognized the principle of duress in both
common law and criminal statutes.17 International criminal law and
international refugee law both largely mirror these domestic principles.
While certainly not reaching the level of a jus cogens norm,18 the
synchrony among the bodies of law is striking, and the distinctions are
relatively small. These diverse bodies of law share core elements: that the
13. See infra Part II.A, notes 144–146 and accompanying text.
14. See INA § 101(a)(42); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) for the definition of a refugee for asylum
purposes.
15. See infra Part II.B for discussion on the Department of Homeland Security’s litigation
position has been to oppose the relevance of duress in understanding bars to asylum; while the Board
of Immigration Appeals within Department of Justice did establish the duress doctrine, the Attorney
General immediately certified the case to himself, which he does when he disagrees with Board
reasoning.
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. “Jus cogens” from the Latin for compelling law. Jus cogens include prohibitions against
slavery, torture, and genocide, and are sometimes labeled “peremptory norms.” See, e.g., Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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person acted from fear of imminent and grave consequences, that the fear
was “well-grounded,” and that the person had no real opportunity to
escape to avoid committing the act. Almost in tandem, the domestic
criminal law and international law reflect a concern that punishment be
meted out in relationship to culpability and recognize that duress
diminishes culpability.
Immigration law is the straggler and outlier to this otherwise richly
developed legal landscape. As seen through the small variations in Ana’s
story, the duress doctrine manifests in very different ways in immigration
law and with important gaps. It might reduce the likelihood of a criminal
case feeding into immigration removals. It might provide affirmative
benefits, in the case of our trafficking law—not merely a way to avoid
removal but a means of accessing the elusive path to citizenship. 19
It is an express exception for people who were involuntary members of the
Communist Party or other totalitarian parties. But it exists more in
principle than in practice for those forced to support terrorists, and it offers
nothing to asylum-seekers. As the greatest outlier, the treatment of duress
in asylum law reveals the critical importance of expressly incorporating
the duress defense and also harmonizing the understanding of
the work done by the doctrine throughout immigration law. This Article
concludes with a demand for a statutory solution because of the
pervasiveness of the disharmony and because the structures that generate
administrative common law are too unstable themselves to be trusted with
resolving the issue.
I. THE DURESS DOCTRINE’S LANDSCAPE AND JUSTIFICATIONS
The doctrine of duress, in both domestic and international law, helps
make sense of culpability for criminal conduct when that conduct is
undertaken under great pressure and fear of significant negative
consequences. Per Black’s Law Dictionary, duress is:
[b]roadly, a threat of harm made to compel a person to do
something against his or her will or judgment; . . . Duress
practically destroys a person’s free agency, causing nonvolitional
conduct because of the wrongful external pressure. . . .
The use or threatened use of unlawful force—usu. that a
reasonable person cannot resist—to compel someone to commit

19. See also AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, WHY DON’T IMMIGRANTS APPLY FOR CITIZENSHIP?
(2019). See generally Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The Dream Act, Immigration Reform and
Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101 (2013).
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an unlawful act. Duress is a recognized defense to a crime,
contractual breach, or tort.20
Duress reduces, and sometimes removes, criminal culpability.
In both settings, as set forth in greater detail in Parts I.B and I.C, there
must be “a threat of force directed at the time of the [individual’s] conduct;
a threat sufficient to induce a well-grounded fear of impending death or
serious bodily injury; and [the individual must] lack a reasonable
opportunity to escape harm other than by engaging in the illegal
activity.”21 And in the international context, a fourth element, known as
the proportionality element, limits the availability of the defense to
situations where “the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than
the one sought to be avoided.”22
The literature on the duress defense is broad ranging, from moral
philosophy and criminology to exegesis of the common law in domestic,
foreign, and international contexts.23 The intent of this section is to provide
sufficient understanding of the rationale for the defense, to identify the
major articulations of it, and to help inform the discussion of duress in U.S.
immigration law, which follows in Part II.
A. Theoretical Bases for the Duress Defense
Duress complicates two of the principal justifications underlying
criminal law: deterrence and punishment. Someone who acts only under
extreme coercion will not likely be deterred by the prospect of punishment
under the law; embedded in the doctrine of duress is the notion that the
coercion is fairly extreme. Likewise, someone who commits an act only
because of coercion is, per most criminologists, policymakers, and moral
philosophers alike, less culpable than someone who acts voluntarily.24 In
the various iterations elaborated upon below, courts and legislatures
attempt to balance the somewhat elusive idea of culpability, which
includes a moral element, with traditional criminal justice values like

20. Duress, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
21. United States v. Gonzalez, 407 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2005).
22. Martin Gottwald, Asylum Claims and Drug Offences: The Seriousness Threshold of Article
1F(B) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the UN Drug Conventions, 18
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 81, 107 (2006).
23. See, e.g., infra notes 24, 30, and 60 for many of the interesting works.
24. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“This emphasis
on culpability in sentencing decisions has long been reflected in Anglo-American jurisprudence. As
this Court observed in Eddings, the common law has struggled with the problem of developing a
capital punishment system that is ‘sensible to the uniqueness of the individual.’ Lockett and Eddings
reflect the belief that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
defendant. Thus, the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response
to the defendant’s background, character, and crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion.”).
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deterrence and punishment.25 Whether (and to what extent) the duress
defense exists is crucial to help answer the question of how criminally
responsible someone is for actions they may not have wanted to commit.
Deterrence is a core justification for criminal law punishments,26 and
the founding architect of criminology, Cesare Beccaria, held the
consequentialist view that the criminal’s intent should not matter, only
their actions:
They err, therefore, who imagine that a crime is greater, or less,
according to the intention of the person by whom it is committed;
for this will depend on the actual impression of objects on the
senses, and on the previous disposition of the mind; both which
will vary in different persons, and even in the same person at
different times, according to the succession of ideas, passions, and
circumstances. Upon that system, it would be necessary to form,
not only a particular code for every individual, but a new penal
law for every crime. Men, often with the best intention, do the
greatest injury to society, and with the worst, do it the most
essential services.27
If intent does not matter, then any duress affecting the person’s
actions (and diminishing intent) would also be irrelevant. However,
as discussed in Parts I.B and I.C, most criminal laws, with the
significant exception of homicide laws, do consider intent and factor
duress into understanding whether that intent exists, or if it exists, whether
it is excused.
Duress undermines the deterrent argument for criminal punishments,
and laws have evolved to permit questions of duress to affect culpability
and criminal consequences. The concern is that someone is acting not
because they disregard the (deterrent) consequences but because some
greater harm would befall them if they did not engage in the conduct.

25. See infra Sections I.B.1 and I.C.
26. See also Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just”
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 857 (2002) (“The principal consequentialist theories of
punishment justify punishment based on the good consequences of rehabilitating the offender so that
she will not commit future crimes, incapacitating the offender so that he cannot commit crimes during
the term of imprisonment, deterring the offender from committing future crimes (specific deterrence),
and deterring others in society from committing future crimes (general deterrence).”); Dan M. Kahan,
The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 415 (1999) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM,
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1823)). See generally CESARE BONESANA DI
BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS ch. XII (1764) (W.C. Little & Co. 1872) (“The
end of punishment, therefore, is no other, than to prevent others from committing the like offence.”).
27. BECCARIA, supra note 26.
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Coercion thus weakens the deterrent effect;28 Professor Dressler has
commented that for someone “in thrall to some coercive power, the threat
of criminal punishment is ineffective.”29 Elsewhere he writes that “we
excuse the insane or coerced actor because she is undeterrable.”30 And
while someone may commit a criminal act, their lack of criminal intent
makes them less worthy of punishment.
Punishment is another core objective of criminal law, separate from
deterrence, and reflects the value of retribution (or, alternately,
consequences for wrongdoers). Drawing upon Kantian ethics, Professor
Russell Christopher writes, “[e]ssentially, retributivism justifies
punishment based not on its consequences but solely because an offender
deserves it. . . . Under retributivism, morally culpable wrongdoing or guilt
deserves, merits, or warrants punishment. It is morally fitting that an
offender should suffer in proportion to her desert or culpable
wrongdoing.”31
This question of who deserves punishment clearly raises an
assignment of moral responsibility. Professor Stephen Massey grapples
with legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart’s accounting of moral responsibility:
[We] want to know to what extent the actor is morally
blameworthy or morally obliged to make amends. Thus, the
relevant inquiry considers not only the actor’s causal relation to
the harm, but also such factors as the actor’s knowledge and
ability to control his conduct. Assignment of responsibility in this
sense carries with it the implication that the actor must answer or
account for his conduct, and that he is properly blameworthy when
he should and could have acted differently.32
Duress factors into these italicized phrases—duress may affect
the ability to control conduct and questions whether someone could have
acted differently.

28. That might be the deterrent of incarceration or fines, social stigma, or other deterrents. See
David Crump, Deterrence, 49 ST. MARY’S L.J. 317, 318 (2018) (“[T]he mechanism by which
deterrence works remains elusive . . . .”).
29. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 300 (3d ed. 2001), accord Gregory F.
Laufer, Admission Denied: In Support of a Duress Exception to the Immigration and Nationality Act’s
“Material Support for Terrorism” Provision, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 437, 481 (2006).
30. Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the
Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1165 (1987).
31. Christopher, supra note 26, at 859.
32. Stephen J. Massey, Individual Responsibility for Assisting the Nazis in Persecuting Civilians,
71 MINN. L. REV. 97, 138 (1986) (emphasis added).
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B. Duress and Culpability in Domestic Criminal Law
1. Defining Duress
The duress defense has old origins in common law.33 The concept
stems from an understanding that the intent—or mens rea—of the
individual may matter greatly. While strict liability crimes certainly exist,
including drug possession or statutory rape, many crimes require that
the perpetrator have a requisite mental state.34 Duress may be a factor in
understanding that requisite mental state. It does not negate the
knowledge element of many crimes, but rather might be offered as a
defense to excuse or justify the commission of a crime that might have
been committed knowingly.35
Defining the precise contours of the duress defense is a more
challenging matter. All circuits have addressed the question of where
duress exists, but they differ at the margins. Common to all circuits, the
duress defense requires that the individual faced a highly serious negative
consequences, like “an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious bodily
injury.”36 More minor bodily injuries would not suffice nor would harm to
property; these would be deemed insufficient excuses.37 The Court in
United States v. Vigol explains why this seriousness matters:

33. See Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 809 A.2d 256, 261 (Pa. 2002) (legislature codified duress
because the common law defense was too difficult for defendants to meet); State v. Riker, 869 P.2d
43, 51 (Wash. 1994) (legislature created stringent duress statute due to the state’s skepticism and
“reluctance to allow even the abnormal stresses of life to provide a basis for the defense”); see infra
Part III for importance of codification. See generally Fatma E. Marouf, Invoking Federal Common
Law Defenses in Immigration Cases, 66 UCLA L. REV. 142, 166–69 (2019). Increasingly, however,
legislatures have stepped in to either codify the clear common law, or to clarify in the absence of such
clarity.
34. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-702(1)(a) (West 2019) (requisite mental state for
manslaughter statute is recklessness); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-3(a)(1) (1975) (“A person
commits . . . manslaughter if . . . [they] recklessly cause[] the death of another . . . .”); see also N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-16-6 (West 1978) (“Fraud consists of the intentional misappropriation or taking of
anything of value that belongs to another by means of fraudulent conduct, practices or
representations.”).
35. See United States v. Haischer, 780 F.3d 1277, 1283–84 (9th Cir. 2015) (duress and the
absence of the required mens rea are not the same thing, noting that “knowledge is not categorically
inconsistent with duress”); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980) (“In the present case,
we must examine both the mental element, or mens rea, required for conviction . . . and the
circumstances under which the ‘evil-doing hand’ can avoid liability under that section because
coercive conditions or necessity negates a conclusion of guilt even though the necessary mens rea was
present.”). For a general discussion of whether duress is a justification or an excuse, see Madeline
Engel, Comment, Unweaving the Dixon Blanket Rule: Flexible Treatment to Protect the Morally
Innocent, 87 OR. L. REV. 1327, 1330–31 (2008).
36. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409.
37. See L.I. Reiser, Annotation, Coercion, Compulsion, or Duress as Defense to Criminal
Prosecution, 40 A.L.R.2d 908 (1955).

2021]

Duress in Immigration Law

317

The apprehension of any loss of property, by waste, or fire; or
even an apprehension of a slight or remote injury to the person,
furnish no excuse. If, indeed, such circumstances could avail, it
would be in the power of every crafty leader of tumults and
rebellion, to indemnify his followers, by uttering previous
menaces; an avenue would be forever open for the escape of
unsuccessful guilt; and the whole fabric of society must,
inevitably, be laid prostrate.38
In some circuits, this principle looks more like a nexus requirement
“that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between
the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.”39 In any event, speculative
future harm will not be enough to satisfy this requirement.40
Courts also agree that the threat of those consequences are not mere
pressures or incentives but are “present, imminent, and impending, and of
such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily injury if the act is not done.”41 While this factor incorporates
some of the same analysis as imminence and seriousness, its essence is
whether the threat is believable. For example, the Fifth Circuit examined
the past history between the defendant and the person making a threat to
show whether the threat was “well-grounded.”42 Other formulations
require a “reasonable belief” that the threat is true43 or “reasonable grounds
for believing” the threat.44
This requires an inquiry into the facts surrounding the threat, as a
“fear which would be irrational in one set of circumstances may be
well-grounded if the experience of the defendant with those applying the
threat is such that the defendant can reasonably anticipate being harmed
on failure to comply.”45 The Court of Appeals of Maryland urged this kind
38. United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346, 347 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (with a footnote well
worth reading, questioning why the jury in this case had to be found at a nearby bar before delivering
their verdict).
39. Marouf, supra note 33, at 1674 (citing United States v. Lomax, 87 F.3d 959, 961 (8th Cir.
1996)); see also United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir. 1979).
40. See United States v. Nwoye, 663 F.3d 460, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing R.I. Recreation Ctr.,
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 604–05 (1st Cir. 1949) (affirming the denial of duress
defense for defendant who was threatened by armed men who said they would “take care of” his family
if he did not comply, because the threat was of “future unspecified harm”)).
41. Reiser, supra note 37, § 2 (emphasis added). This language is tantalizingly close to the core
asylum concept of a “well-founded fear.” See infra Part III.B.
42. See United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 1994).
43. See People v. Williamson, 218 Cal. Rptr. 550, 559 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Byrd v.
Commonwealth, 16 S.E. 727, 729 (Va. 1893).
44. See Reese v. State, 869 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
45. Debra Oakes, Annotation, Availability of Defense of Duress or Coercion in Prosecution for
Violation of Federal Narcotics Laws, 71 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 481 § 4 (2013).
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of fact-rich understanding in McMillan v. State.46 The lower court had
limited duress to one very specific context, finding that “for duress to
occur, there has to be a situation in which someone is, in effect, holding a
gun to his head at the time that he commits the crime, and that didn’t
happen.”47 Instead, the court reasoned that
[w]hile the trial court’s example illustrates an obvious situation of
duress, we do not agree that it constitutes the entire universe of the
scenarios that can suffice as coercive. Being threatened with
weapons is not the only possibility. A jury may infer from witness
testimony, including that of a defendant, that threats by identified
gang members . . . when no weapons are displayed or when there
are no weapons, that the defendant had a “well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily injury.”48
Circuits and legislatures are divided over how objective this standard
is in the relatively well-developed setting of Battered Person Syndrome.49
All circuits do agree that the defense of duress only works where there is
a lack of a reasonable opportunity to escape harm other than by engaging
in the illegal activity.50 Included in the reasonableness of escape is the idea
that the individual must seek out police aid or protection.51
The three core requirements of the duress doctrine thus far are that
(1) the defendant faced a highly serious negative consequence, (2) the
threat of that consequence was believable, and (3) the defendant
reasonably believed they would be harmed if they failed to comply.
Beyond these three requirements, other circuits have added additional
elements. One additional element is akin to an assumption-of-the-risk
46. See McMillan v. State, 51 A.3d 623 (Md. 2012).
47. Id. at 637 (quoting the trial court).
48. Id.
49. The complexities of that area of law are beyond the scope of this article, but the comparisons
are worth exploration in future scholarship. See generally Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of
Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 217, 311
(2003) (“Outside the cases where an abuse victim killed her batterer, courts and feminist legal
scholarship have recognized that battered women can be coerced or forced into unlawful conduct,
providing a basis for a duress defense.”). To the extent the two areas of law have already been
compared, the scholarship focuses on “battered women” claims to asylum. See, e.g., Marisa Silenzi
Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: Separation Violence as a Basis for Refugee
Protection for Battered Women, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 337 (2009).
50. See United States v. Diaz, 736 F.3d 1143, 1150 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Gonzalez,
407 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2005).
51. United States v. Scott, 901 F.2d 871, 874 (10th Cir. 1990) (A defendant with such “countless
opportunities to contact law enforcement authorities or [to] escape the perceived threats” cannot as a
matter of law avail herself of the duress defense). But see United States v. Lopez, 913 F.3d 807, 822
(9th Cir. 2019) (“[A] jury may consider the defendant’s prior experience with police response to abuse
in determining whether it was reasonable for her not to contact [the police] once threatened by the
coercing party.”).
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principle; courts have held that the defense is unavailable where an
individual voluntarily, recklessly, or negligently placed themselves in a
situation in which it was probable that one would be subject to duress.52
Similarly, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits add a requirement that the illegal
conduct lasted only as long as it was “absolutely necessary.”53 As
discussed in the next section, international and foreign law addressing
duress likewise typically have more than three requirements, so the Sixth
and Eighth Circuits are in line with that more detailed understanding.54
Concerning proportionality, the individual cannot invoke a duress
defense if the act they commit is worse than the harm they fear. This
proportionality limitation requires an investigation into and comparison of
what the individual fears and what the individual is coerced into doing.55
Thus, the defense is not available for homicide, as multiple courts and
legislatures have made clear.56 However, even in the homicide context, it
may have some impact—it can be a defense to felony-murder57
and can reduce a homicide charge to manslaughter.58 One legislature has
clarified that it is not available for robbery59 and another for crimes
punishable by death.60
The Model Penal Code has also addressed this question, defining
duress in these terms:
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct
charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so
by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person
52. See United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 484 (9th Cir. 1983); see also United States v.
Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 541 (3d Cir. 1991) (defendant must not have recklessly put themselves into
the situation where the duress arose); United States v. Blanco, 754 F.2d 940, 943 (11th Cir. 1985) (like
the Paolello holding, except that the standard is “recklessly or negligently” (emphasis added)).
53. United States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Stover,
822 F.2d 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding the duress defense unavailable because when the police
arrived, the defendant was “no longer in any imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury”).
54. See infra Part I.C.
55. PAUL H. ROBINSON, 2 CRIM. L. DEF. § 177 (2020) (duress as an excuse defense).
56. See generally R.I. Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir.
1949); State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755, 761 (N.J. 1977); State v. Rumble, 680 S.W.2d 939, 942
(Mo. 1984) (“Section 562.071.2 in unmistakably clear language declares that duress is not a defense
to the crime of murder—any murder.”).
57. See McMillan v. State, 51 A.3d 623, 634–35 (Md. 2012) (permitting the duress defense in
reference to felony-murder, where the defense would excuse the underlying felony—as opposed to
excluding the murder itself (emphasis added)).
58. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.08 (West 1963) (by statute, if one is forced to intentionally kill
another under duress, murder charge is dropped to manslaughter).
59. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-5-1 (West 1977); see also Ballard v. State, 464 N.E.2d 328, 330
(Ind. 1984) (no duress defense is available for the crime of robbery).
60. NEV. REV. STAT. § 194.010(8) (West 1911); see also Cabrera v. State, 454 P.3d 722, 724
(Nev. 2019) (“The statute plainly states that duress is not a defense when ‘the crime is punishable [by]
death.’”).
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or the person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in
his situation would have been unable to resist.61
Notably absent from the Code’s definition is a proportionality
requirement; nothing in this definition rules out the defense categorically
even for the charge of murder.62
2. When Duress Matters in the Criminal Legal System
Duress matters in four different phases of the criminal process. First,
facts like Ana’s, from the introduction, might cause a prosecutor to decline
to prosecute as an exercise in prosecutorial discretion.63 Second, duress
might shape what kind of plea deal a prosecutor offers.64 Third, for cases
that avoid plea bargaining and go to trial, proof of duress could sufficiently
negate the mens rea the prosecutor is required to prove. Finally, duress can
be a mitigating factor in sentencing. As Professor Chiao writes,
“[a]lthough there are famous disputes about mitigating and aggravating
conditions for criminal acts generally, these disputes should not blind us
to large swaths of relatively stable agreement—for instance, . . . that
duress and infancy tend to exculpate[.]”65
C. Duress and Culpability in International Law
A similarly rich body of law is developing in public international
law, and specifically in international criminal law and international
refugee law. Developments in these two areas then inform a third area:
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (AM. L. INST. 1962).
62. See Benjamin J. Risacher, Note, No Excuse: The Failure of the ICC’s Article 31 “Duress”
Definition, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1403, 1411 (2014) (noting that the Code definition “encapsulates
the idea that the will has been overcome and therefore, without a free choice, there can be no moral
culpability”).
63. “The decision to charge or decline charges is totally within the discretion of the prosecutor.”
Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1063, 1071 (2016).
64. As Professor Peter Margulies describes,
Equity . . . is equally important to the legitimacy of plea bargaining. In a democratic system,
plea bargaining should avoid both the caprice of treating like cases differently and the
cruelty of ignoring differences in defendants’ circumstances. A plea bargaining system
injures the cause of equity if it permits wildly disparate results for similarly situated
defendants, singles out particular classes of defendants for harsh treatment, or ignores
individualizing factors such as duress, which should mitigate culpability or punishment.
Peter Margulies, Battered Bargaining: Domestic Violence and Plea Negotiation in the Criminal
Justice System, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 153, 155 (2001).
65. Vincent Chiao, Ex Ante Fairness in Criminal Law and Procedure, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
277, 291 (2012). But see Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125,
141–42 (2008) (“In legal practice, criminal attorneys spend much of their time arguing about the
appropriate sentence after a guilty plea, not the best fit between the likely facts and the most apt code
section. . . . The real action in criminal practice happens at sentencing, and there the defendant’s mental
state stays on the periphery—note how little the federal sentencing guidelines discuss mens rea.”).
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foreign law that incorporates the evolving international legal norms. This
section addresses each of these three areas in turn.
1. International Criminal Law
International criminal law has been defined with varying degrees of
breadth, but it essentially concerns violations of public international laws,
which may arise from traditional norms (such as laws against genocide
and piracy) or from treaties. This section briefly describes the two
principal developments in this arena that concern duress: (1) crimes
against humanity and (2) grounds for excluding criminal responsibility.
First, with the increase in international criminal tribunals since the
1990s,66 there have been more opportunities to define and examine the
understanding of duress in this body of law. The major case doing so is
Prosecutor v. Erdemović in the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (ICTY).67 In that case, the ICTY court held that “duress does
not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against
humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human
beings.”68 In reaching this decision, the judges searched for a unifying
principle from existing international common law; finding none, they
decided to interpret the duress doctrine from the perspective of the ICTY’s
strongly protective purpose and ruled on the unavailability of the defense
for murder.69
Second, subsequent to Erdemović, the major development
internationally has been the International Criminal Court (ICC), created
through the 1998 Rome Statute, and entering into force in 2002.70 The

66. The 1990s gave rise to two of the first such tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See generally International
Tribunals, UNITED NATIONS SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire
/international-tribunals [https://perma.cc/G433-5U2X].
67. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997).
68. Id. ¶ 19.
69. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald
and Judge Vohrah ¶ 75 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997) (“We must bear in
mind that we are operating in the realm of international humanitarian law which has, as one of its
prime objectives, the protection of the weak and vulnerable in such a situation where their lives and
security are endangered.”). But see Risacher, supra note 62, at 1420 (“General deterrence is thought
to help prevent future crimes by members of society at large by making an example and punishing an
actor for his criminal behavior. The problem is that coerced individuals are not thinking about avoiding
punishment from a legal body; rather they have had their free will overcome by a threat that no
reasonable person could resist. In a similar vein, an individual who has the unfortunate fate of finding
himself under coercion twice is not going to give weight to the fact that he was previously punished
for a similar act.”).
70. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
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Rome Statute codified a definition at Article 31 (“Grounds for excluding
criminal responsibility”), Section (1)(d):
The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting from
a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious
bodily harm against that person or another person, and the person
acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that
the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one
sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be: (i) Made by
other persons; or (ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond
that person’s control.71
This definition overlaps with that described in U.S. domestic
criminal law: (1) an emphasis on imminent harm, (2) reasonable actions
needed to avoid the threat, and (3) proportionality of the conduct.72 While
new to public international law, this third element—the proportionality
approach, which essentially precludes the defense in cases of homicide—
can be seen throughout common law jurisdictions internationally.73
One case before the ICC has raised this defense, the case of Dominic
Ongwen, an alleged commander in the Lord’s Resistance Army in
Uganda.74 He has sought to avail of the defense under Article 31(1)(d), but
as of this writing, there has been no final decision in his case.75

71. Id. at art. 31(1)(d).
72. See generally Jennifer Bond, Principled Exclusions: A Revised Approach to Article 1(F)(A)
of the Refugee Convention, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 15, 48–56 (2013).
73. Joseph Rikhof, War Criminals Not Welcome; How Common Law Countries Approach the
Phenomenon of International Crimes in the Immigration and Refugee Context,
21 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 453, 507 (2009) (statement of Joseph Rikhof from his study of Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand) (“The defence . . . has been considered in all countries under consideration
and, . . . the other four [non-U.S.] countries allow the defence, if all requirements are present,
including, most importantly, that of proportionality between the harm to be inflicted and the harm to
be received.”). But see Risacher, supra note 62, at 1408 (finding that civil law jurisdictions are far less
likely to expressly preclude the defense even for homicide).
74. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Defence Notification Pursuant to Rules 79(2) and
80(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ¶ 5 (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_05556.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS8D-CN8M] (“(a) Any alleged acts
committed during the temporal jurisdiction outlined by Pre-Trial Chamber II would have been
committed under duress; (b) The duress would have been caused by Joseph Kony and his close
advisors; (c) The duress would have come from a continuing threat of imminent death and imminent
threat of serious bodily harm against Mr[.] Ongwen and against other persons which was beyond Mr[.]
Ongwen’s control; and (d) Mr[.] Ongwen’s alleged intended conduct is not alleged to have caused a
greater harm than the one which was avoided.”).
75. The status of the case can be found at the International Criminal Tribunal’s website for the
case. Ongwen Case, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/ongwen [https://perma.cc/
LLK9-EPTD].
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2. International Refugee Law
Duress law is far more richly developed in international refugee law.
The grounds for denying protection to an otherwise eligible refugee arise
from Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention,76 also known as the
“exclusion clauses.”77 These clauses are where the duty not to return
refugees crosses with the right of states to self-protection, which would be
the concern for people accused of criminal or persecutory acts.
International understanding of the bars to refugee protection strongly
favors a cautious approach to denying protection to otherwise eligible
individuals—first by reserving the bars for the most compelling and
serious cases, and second by permitting a duress defense.
To establish the Refugee Convention, nations wanted assurance that
they would not be required to allow dangerous individuals who would be
a threat to the public safety of the receiving country.78 That context
matters, for it is not every criminal offense that limits the protections of
the Convention, but only highly serious ones. Interpreting both the
Convention and its founding documents (the travaux preparatoires), the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) states that
only capital crimes or “very grave punishable act[s]” fall under this ground
for denying asylum.79 Separate UNHCR guidance lists “homicide, rape,
arson and armed robbery” as the kinds of crimes covered, and notes that
“certain other offenses could also be deemed serious if they are
accompanied by the use of deadly weapons, serious injury to persons,
evidence of habitual criminal conduct and other similar factors.”80 In short,
UNHCR states “[c]onsidering the serious consequences of exclusion for
the person concerned . . . the interpretation of these exclusion clauses must
be restrictive.”81
Even if someone were to have committed a serious nonpolitical
crime by this more stringent definition, though, international refugee law
76. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter
Refugee Convention]. Refugee Convention duties are incorporated by reference in the
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art.1, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S.
267, 268–70.
77. Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The Exclusion Clauses: Guidelines on Their
Application ¶ 4 (Dec. 1996) [hereinafter The Exclusion Clauses].
78. James C. Hathaway & Colin J. Harvey, Framing Refugee Protection in the New World
Disorder, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 257, 262 (2001) (“[T]he Refugee Convention’s drafters recognized
the importance of reassuring states that accession to international refugee law would not require them
to admit either international criminals or fugitives from justice.”).
79. Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, ¶ 155, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook].
80. The Exclusion Clauses, supra note 77, ¶ 51.
81. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 79, ¶ 149 (emphasis added).
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allows for a duress defense, and for special consideration of offenses
committed by minors. UNHCR offers this balancing test for the
duress exception:
As for duress, this applies where the act in question results from
the person concerned necessarily and reasonably avoiding a threat
of imminent death, or of continuing or imminent serious bodily
harm to him- or herself or another person, and the person does not
intend to cause greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.82
This definition mirrors that of the Rome Statute with its three requirements
of imminent harm, proportionality, and reasonableness.83
The origins and interpretation of the Refugee Convention also
require a special focus on how duress affects the criminal culpability of
minors. Despite the Convention’s lack of an explicit exception for minors,
UNHCR advises that the exclusion clauses do apply to minors, but only
for those of sufficient age and mental capacity to be criminally
responsible: “Given the vulnerability of children, great care should be
exercised in considering exclusion with respect to a minor and defences
such as duress should in particular be examined carefully.”84 This
understanding of the applicability of the duress defense makes sense in
light of the purpose of Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention, which
focuses on the integrity of the refugee system.85 The system is built upon
some notion of who “deserv[es]” protection, and excludes war criminals,
human rights violators and others.86 If someone committed an act without
requisite intent—either because of duress or age—then that person is not
the kind of danger that the exclusion clauses concern. As one commentator
has noted, it would be manifestly unfair to incorporate only some aspects
of criminal law in analyzing these bars:
All of these elements must also be considered in the refugee
context—it is arbitrary and unjust for refugee law to rely on criminal
concepts while ignoring certain aspects of the doctrine and key
underlying principles, including the need for autonomous will.87
82. Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection:
Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/05 (Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter UNHCR Exclusion Clauses].
83. Rome Statute, supra note 70.
84. UNHCR Exclusion Clauses, supra note 77, ¶ 28.
85. Refugee Convention, supra note 76, at art. 1F.
86. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 79, at ch. IV § B(3); see also Matter of McMullen,
19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 97 (B.I.A. 1984) (“This exclusion from refugee status under the Act represents the
view that those who have participated in the persecution of others are unworthy and not deserving of
international protection.”).
87. Jennifer Bond, The Defence of Duress in Canadian Refugee Law, 41 QUEEN’S L.J. 409, 418
(2016).
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3. Foreign Law Interpreting the Refugee Convention
Countries with case law illuminating the availability of a duress
defense generally follow the same principles laid out in both the U.S.
criminal law and international law settings but with some inclusion of
additional factors, as described here. This section is far from exhaustive
but highlights recent or significant cases from countries with
well-developed asylum jurisprudence.
Canada looked to international law in formulating its test for duress88
but has gone beyond it to establish the most detailed test of any country.
The Canadian test lays out six factors needed for a successful duress
defense. There must be (1) an explicit or implied threat of death or bodily
harm; (2) a reasonable belief the threat would be carried out; (3) no safe
avenue of escape; (4) a close temporal connection between the threat and
harm threatened (but does not include threats of future harm); (5)
proportionality between harm threatened and harm inflicted; and (6) the
accused did not voluntarily partake in groups activities knowing that
threats and coercion were a possible result.89
One case from Canada situates the analysis at the very initial stage,
whether the exclusion clauses are triggered at all. In Canada v. Maan,90 an
Indian man knowingly carried drugs after a militant group threatened him
and his family members with death. The Canadian Immigration and
Refugee Board, reviewing his case, “found that there were not ‘serious
reasons for considering’ that the Respondent committed a crime, given the
presence of duress, and the lack of a mens rea, therefore the Convention
exclusion does not apply.”91 On appeal by the Government, the court
accepted this reasoning.92 This initial inapplicability of the exclusion
grounds matters profoundly because, unlike in the criminal legal system
where duress often works as a mitigating factor in sentencing, there is no
“mitigation” equivalent in asylum cases because the applicant is either
granted asylum or not. As will be discussed in Part IV, the duress doctrine
is thus helpful as a funneling device, taking the asylum bars out of
contention from the outset.93
88. See id. at 426–28. Sources included the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, Statutes and jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, and the provisions of the Rome Statute
of the ICC.
89. R. v. Ryan, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 14 (Can.). Note that the availability of the defense does not mean
it is terribly successful. Bond notes that of twenty cases where the defense was raised, 70% failed,
most often because they lacked the required “imminence” to prevail in the six-part test. Bond, supra
note 87, at 424–25.
90. Canada v. Maan, [2007] F.C. 583 (Can. Ont.).
91. Id. ¶ 9.
92. Id. ¶¶ 24–26.
93. See infra Part III.
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New Zealand has focused on the individual’s intent in duress (or
coercion) cases, looking at whether the individual had a “shared common
purpose” with the people directing them to commit the crimes.94 One such
case involved a Sri Lankan young man whom the Sri Lankan Army (SLA)
forced (by credible death threats against him and remaining family
members) to report on members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
(LTTE), which put those people at “grave risk of being tortured by the
SLA.”95 The central issue for the court was “the mens rea ingredient and
the degree of appellant’s complicity in the actions of the LTTE and the
SLA.”96 The court did “not consider that the appellant at any time shared
a common purpose with either the SLA or the LTTE. He was coerced into
providing assistance by both organisations. The LTTE threatened to
kill him and his family.”97 The court engaged in no further analysis of
components of duress, except to cite to the treatise by refugee law scholar
James Hathaway that seeks the absence of intent where someone
acted “only in order to avoid grave and imminent peril” that a reasonable
person would believe was imminent and that the conduct was not “in
excess of that which would otherwise have been directed at the person
alleging coercion.”98
The United Kingdom makes the duress defense an initial evidentiary
burden to “raise a ground for excluding criminal responsibility” to see if
the person actually comes under the application of the Refugee
Convention’s Exclusion Clauses99 and applies the Rome Statute for
substantive understanding of those clauses.100 In 2016, the U.K.’s
administrative Upper Tribunal issued a decision in AB and The Secretary
of State for the Home Department.101 The Tribunal considered both the
Rome Statute and the Erdemovic case in grappling with duress. The case
involved a former Iranian women’s prison guard who, after a decade in
lower level work, assumed a position where she transferred inmates over
to the Intelligence Services, where they were presumably tortured.102 She
testified fearing that, “if she had left without permission[,] she would have
been treated as a traitor, imprisoned, tortured and perhaps raped.”103 Citing
94. Refugee Appeal No. 74646, [2003] NZRSAA 261 ¶ 52 (June 26, 2003) https://forms.justice.
govt.nz/search/Documents/IPTV2/RefugeeProtection/ref_20030626_74646.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7PYR-5GUB]. See generally Rikhof, supra note 71.
95. Refugee Appeal No. 74646, [2003] NZRSAA ¶ 51.
96. Id. ¶ 52.
97. Id. ¶ 53.
98. Id. ¶ 54 (quoting JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 218 (1st ed. 1991)).
99. AB v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2016] UKUT 00376 (IAC).
100. Id. [19].
101. Id. [82]–[83].
102. Id. [8]–[13].
103. Id. [16].
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Rome Statute Art. 30(2),104 the court found there were serious reasons
to believe she had committed a crime against humanity and then turned
to the question of duress as an excuse.105 It found that Erdemovic was not
binding and had been superseded by the Rome Statute.106 Significantly,
the court placed the burden on the Government to “establish that there
are serious reasons for considering that the appellant did not act
under duress.”107
The U.K. court read Article 31 of the Rome Statute as having five
components: (1) threat of imminent death or other serious harm; (2) threat
made beyond the control of the applicant; (3) threat directed against the
applicant or “some other” undefined person; (4) the applicant acted
“necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat;” and (5) the harm caused
was not greater than the harm avoided (the proportionality requirement).108
The particular applicant in AB failed to meet several aspects of this test,
and her appeal failed, raising the important point—before this Article turns
to duress in immigration law—that the existence of a duress defense
clearly does not mean the defense will be successful. However, the ability
to plead that defense decreases the chances that someone will be
erroneously excluded from protection, against the intentions of the
Refugee Convention.
II. DURESS INCOHERENCE IN IMMIGRATION LAW
This Part of the Article will consider the different areas where duress
matters, in a descending order from most beneficial to the noncitizen, to
least. Interestingly, two of those more preferential areas exist in the realm
of the government’s two longstanding high priorities for removal: people
involved in criminal activity, and people engaged in terrorist activity. As
will be shown, for these two groups the existence of duress matters
greatly—a fact that is implicit in noncitizen engagement in the criminal
legal system, and explicit in the context of the terrorism grounds of
inadmissibility and removability. At the opposite end of the scale is the
deeply puzzling realm of asylum law, where the mere idea of the duress
doctrine is deeply contested. This section lays out the state of the duress
doctrine in each area before turning to the rationales and methods for
resolving this puzzle in the conclusion.
104. Id. [21] (“For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: (a) In relation to
conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) in relation to a consequence, that person
means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”
(quoting art. 30 of the Rome Statute)).
105. Id. [80].
106. Id. [52].
107. Id. [62] (emphasis added).
108. Id. [63].
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A. A Descending Hierarchy of Duress
The descending hierarchy sketched out below rests upon two
assessments. First, eligibility for immigration benefits is the ideal and
avoiding removal proceedings is less ideal but still valuable for the
noncitizen. Second, in looking at grounds of inadmissibility and
deportability, it is better to meet an exception (and thus not have the
ground apply at all) than to qualify to apply for a discretionary waiver. But
both of these are better than legal scenarios where relief is
foreclosed entirely. With those assessments in mind, this section looks at
duress as the basis for a trafficking visa, duress as a limiting factor in
crimmigration-based removals, duress as an exception and waiver to
inadmissibility and removal grounds, and then denaturalization and
asylum, where the relevance of duress remains contested.
1. Duress as a Basis for Relief: Human Trafficking
As discussed in the opening story about Ana, immigration law
expressly provides a benefit to a subset of people who have endured
duress: victims of “a severe form of human trafficking.” 109 The Act
defines this as:
(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by
force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to
perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or
(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or
obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of
force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.110
Although the definition of a trafficking victim uses the word
“coercion” and not “duress,” the two terms are used interchangeably in
criminal law to mean the same thing.111 Notably, age functions as a proxy
for duress in the definition of sex trafficking in Subsection A. While older
victims of sex trafficking need to establish some aspect of force, fraud, or
coercion in order to qualify as a victim of a severe form of trafficking,
those below the age of eighteen qualify without making any such showing;
their young age removes their culpability in commercial sex work and
makes them victims rather than perpetrators.112
109. INA § 101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I).
110. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(11) (emphasis added).
111. See United States v. Logan, 49 F.3d 352, 359 (8th Cir. 1995); State v. Baker, 197 P.3d 421,
427 (Kan. 2008).
112. Megan Annitto, Consent, Coercion, and Compassion: Emerging Legal Responses to the
Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 39–43 (2011) (tracing the
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The benefits of meeting this definition are significant. A successful
applicant for the “T” visa, which is available to victims of trafficking, will
have a visa and work authorization for a four-year period.113 In the fourth
year, the applicant may apply for permanent residence, which puts them
on the track to citizenship five years later.114 Furthermore, the individual
may initially receive an array of time-limited public benefits, from food
stamps to public housing.115
How does duress show up in typical T visa cases? As in the story told
at the outset, a nineteen-year-old forced (under threat of rape) by a gang
member to engage in extortion or carry drugs could be defined by law
enforcement as a trafficking victim and not as a perpetrator. The gang
member has obtained her for involuntary servitude through coercion—a
clear fit within the statutory eligibility requirements. She would also have
to be willing to cooperate in a criminal investigation of his trafficking and
show why returning to her home country would cause extreme hardship.
Upon showing these things, she can earn the valuable T visa.
These visas are not limited to such dramatic stories. A domestic
worker compelled by threats against her family members to work in her
employer’s office, where the employer commits Medicare fraud, would be
a victim of trafficking and not be considered someone who aided and
abetted fraud. An undocumented day laborer whose employer threatens
him with his gun when he asks for a month of unpaid wages would be
eligible to apply for a T visa, instead of being removable for having
entered illegally. And a girl below the age of eighteen who engages in sex
work at someone else’s behest is defined as a victim of trafficking whether
she perceived herself to be coerced or not. In each of these diverse cases,
the duress the individuals experience is more significant than any illegal
conduct that they engaged in under duress.116

evolving understanding of minors’ culpability in sex work); Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia:
Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977,
2989–90 (2006).
113. Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS. (May 5, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-of-human-trafficking-and-othercrimes/victims-of-human-trafficking-t-nonimmigrant-status [https://perma.cc/YNL6-6DY7].
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Elizabeth Keyes, CASA of Maryland and the Battle Regarding Human Trafficking
and Domestic Workers’ Rights, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 14, 17 (2007). It is
possible that the conduct (from illegal entry to prostitution) would need a waiver of inadmissibility for
the visa to be granted, but in the author’s extensive experience with T visa applications, waivers are
more easily obtainable in that context than many others—precisely because any illegal conduct is
usually linked to the trafficking itself.

330

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 44:307

2. Duress as a Means of Avoiding the Removal Process:
“Crimmigration”
The intersection of criminal law with immigration law, known
popularly as crimmigration, refers in large part to the ways that criminal
conduct triggers a variety of immigration consequences.117 While this
might simply refer to how an arrest brings an individual to the attention of
Department of Homeland Security, through the imposition of an
immigration “detainer,” it often refers to the way criminal conduct118
makes an individual either inadmissible to the country (if never legally
admitted before) or deportable (for all those who had been, at some point
prior, legally admitted). Particularly for the latter category of people, the
conduct might be the only basis the government has to remove someone,
so for them to establish deportability, they must show that the conduct fits
one of the criminal grounds of deportability—for example, showing that
it was an “aggravated felony” (defined for immigration purposes at
INA § 101(a)(43) and famously not required to be either aggravated or a
felony) or that it was a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude committed within
five years of entry, among others.119
Duress does not directly appear in any of the exceptions or waivers
for these criminal grounds of inadmissibility or deportability. However,
because those grounds are almost entirely based upon convictions, the
duress defense is implicitly incorporated completely co-equivalent to how
it shows up in criminal law (domestic or foreign, depending on where the
conviction occurred).120 For example, imagine someone arrested in New
York and charged with committing the crime of assault in the first-degree,
which requires intent and which would constitute an aggravated felony if
the sentence imposed after a conviction were more than one year.121 In the
course of the criminal legal process, if the person establishes a duress
defense, the charges might be dropped to a lesser crime with less severe
117. See generally Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 377 (2006). As described in the introduction, this term was coined by
Professor Juliet Stumpf to encompass the myriad ways that the criminal legal system and immigration
laws intersect.
118. See generally Alia Al-Khatib & Jayesh Rathod, Equity in Contemporary Immigration
Enforcement: Defining Contributions and Countering Criminalization, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 951, 954
(2018). The word “conduct” is carefully chosen because there are a number of ways that conduct,
absent an arrest or conviction, is sufficient to bar individuals from securing status or fighting removal.
119. See generally INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
120. The criminal grounds of inadmissibility include criminal activity (not necessarily
convictions) committed in the United States and other countries. INA § 212(a)(2);
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).
121. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10 (McKinney 1996). For analysis of the immigration
consequences, see REPRESENTING IMMIGRANT DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK Appendix A (5th ed.
2011).
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immigration consequences.122 The individual who can avail themselves of
the duress defense in the criminal proceeding will either avoid an
immigration removal case or have much easier time in the immigration
system as a result.123
The cases that reach Immigration Court through the criminal legal
system thus already benefit from the duress defense to the extent that
defense was available in the criminal case.
3. Duress as an Express Exception: The “Totalitarian Bar”
Another ground of inadmissibility to the U.S. applies to “any
immigrant who is or has been a member of or affiliated with the
Communist or any other totalitarian party (or subdivision or affiliate
thereof), domestic or foreign.”124 However, the statute provides two ways
that an otherwise inadmissible immigrant could legally enter the United
States: (1) an exception specifically for those whose membership “is or
was involuntary, or is or was solely when under sixteen years of age, by
operation of law, or for purposes of obtaining employment, food rations,
or other essentials of living and whether necessary for such purposes”125
and (2) the opportunity to apply for a waiver.126
With regard to the exception, not only is there this double safeguard
built into this particular ground of inadmissibility, but for more than fifty
years, courts have broadened the understanding of this exception even
beyond the plain text. For example, a 2020 case discussed a Chinese
woman who became a Communist Party member in China as an adult,
believing it was the only way to get a job later. When U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) denied her naturalization application, she
argued both the express exception “membership for purposes of obtaining
employment” and the “jurisprudential ‘meaningful association’
exception.”127 This jurisprudential line flows from cases like Galvan v.
Press, in 1954, where the Court expressed discomfort with First
Amendment issues as the United States attempted to deport Communists

122. Id. I do not know what the typical alternate charge would be, or if a duress case would
simply be dropped, but lesser assault offenses are not likely to rise to the level of aggravated felonies.
123. See generally MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
129–51 (8th ed. 2019).
124. INA § 212(a)(3)(D)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(i).
125. Id. In Rowoldt v. Perfetto, Justice Frankfurter also read a kind of “de minimis” approach
into the language of the preceding version of this statute, allowing a long-time permanent resident to
stay in the United States despite his voluntary membership. Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
126. INA § 212(a)(3)(D)(iv); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(iv).
127. Mingyu Zhu v. Miller, No. 3:19-CV-00035-AC, 2020 WL 1330235, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 3,
2020), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Crosby v. Miller, No. 3:19-CV-00035-AC, 2020
WL 1324996 (D. Or. Mar. 20, 2020).
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in the 1940s and 1950s.128 The Supreme Court was concerned with too
broadly assigning culpability to Communist Party members, first reaching
into the legislative history in Galvan v. Press to require a meaningful
association,129 and later redefining what membership itself meant even for
self-identified party members in Rowoldt v. Perfetto.130
This lenient jurisprudence met with criticism at the time, in a dissent
by Justice Harlan to Rowoldt v. Perfetto. Harlan wrote, “I regret my
inability to join the Court’s opinion, for its effort to find a way out from
the rigors of a severe statute has alluring appeal. The difficulty is that in
order to reach its result the Court has had to take impermissible liberties
with the statute.”131 He paints a picture of a man who clearly knew he was
a party member.132 While Justice Harlan acknowledges the “severe
consequences,” and suggests that a Fifth Amendment Due Process
argument might have been persuasive, he found that as a statutory matter,
the Court had invented a result the statute did not permit.133
Professor Frickey has suggested that this, and other Warren-era
jurisprudence, emerged in response to the excesses of the McCarthy era:
These 1950s progenitors arose in a time of political hysteria about
Communism that threatened to drag the Court, already vulnerable
because of southern opposition to Brown, into a maelstrom of
congressional reprisals that would have not merely overturned
cases, but would have entrenched disturbing values into the public
law and institutionally wounded the Court. By generally deciding
these cases at the subconstitutional level through the rules of
avoidance, the Court used techniques that might defuse political

128. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 522 (1954). Important dissents in the 1940s and 1950s also
showed discomfort with the way that the executive branch was denying entry to suspected
Communists. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 550 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (“Indeed, if put to the choice, one might well prefer to live under Soviet substantive law
applied in good faith by our common-law procedures than under our substantive law enforced by
Soviet procedural practices.”).
129. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 527 (“Congress could not have intended to authorize the wholesale
deportation of aliens who, accidentally, artificially, or unconsciously in appearance only, are found to
be members of or affiliated with an organization of whose platform and purposes they have no real
knowledge.” (quoting 97 Cong. Rec. 2373)). The Court found the statute to be constitutional. Id. at
532.
130. 355 U.S. at 115.
131. Id. at 121 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 125 (“The petitioner has freely admitted that he was a member of the Party for about
a year; that he paid Party dues; that he attended Party meetings; and that he worked, without pay, in
the Party bookstore, which he recognized as ‘an official outlet for communist literature.’ Beyond this,
petitioner’s testimony betrayed considerable, albeit rudimentary, knowledge of Communist history
and philosophy.”).
133. Id. at 126.
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opposition while incrementally adjusting public law to better
respect individual liberty.134
While Professor Frickey does not include the Rowaldt case in his
analysis, it certainly fits the argument. Notably, in Galvan, the majority
questioned the wisdom of the statute, even while finding it
constitutional.135 And Justice Harlan’s dissent in Rowoldt makes clear his
view that the Court is trying to work around an ill-advised statute.136
Regardless of the reasons, the leniency continues today, as illustrated
famously by permitting First Lady Melania Trump’s Communist Partymember parents to migrate as lawful permanent residents to the United
States in 2018.137
4. Duress via Waiver: Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds
While the duress defense in crime-related removal cases emerges as
an issue litigated (in most cases) before the individual faces removal as an
additional consequence, the defense exists as an explicit exception for
cases related to the so-called terrorism bars. Furthermore, this defense
exists both as grounds of inadmissibility (the “Terrorism-Related
Inadmissibility Grounds” or “TRIG” bar)138 and deportability (an identical
provision, applied to those who had been previously lawfully admitted
whom the government is now seeking to deport).139
The terrorism bars are purposefully broad and cover a wide range
of actions defined statutorily as “terrorist activity.”140 The statute also
separately defines what it means to “engage in terrorist activity” and
states material support as one of the prohibited activities, including
“a safe house, transportation, communications, funds . . . or other material
financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons
(including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives,
or training.”141 As a result, the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board)
134. Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal
Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L.
REV. 397, 401 (2005).
135. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 528 (1954) (“A fair reading of the legislation requires that
this scope be given to what Congress enacted in 1950, however severe the consequences and whatever
view one may have of the wisdom of the means which Congress employed to meet its desired end.”).
136. Rowoldt, 355 U.S. at 121 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
137. Glenn Kessler, What’s the Immigration Status of Melania Trump’s Parents?, WASH. POST
(Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/02/13/whats-theimmigration-status-of-melania-trumps-parents/?hpid=hp_rhp-more-top-stories_factchecker325am:homepage/story [https://perma.cc/86YB-P7VY].
138. INA § 212(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3).
139. INA § 237(a)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4).
140. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
141. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
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has determined that even de minimis material support, like cooking
and cleaning clothes for terrorists, justifies application of this ground
of inadmissibility.142
Despite the likelihood that this broad interpretation could lead to
harsh results, the Board, in 2016’s Matter of M-H-Z-, rejected the idea that
there is an implicit duress exception to any such activity. Matter of
M-H-Z- considered the situation of a Colombian woman who provided
food and merchandise from her store under threat from the Revolutionary
Armed Forced of Colombia (FARC).143 After reviewing federal court
cases that had declined to find such an exception, the Board reasoned
against an implied duress exception in two ways. First, a different part of
the grounds of inadmissibility (in regard to membership in a totalitarian or
Communist Party) did include a duress exception, and the Board reasoned
that “[i]f Congress intended to make involuntariness or duress an
exception for aliens who provided material support to a terrorist
organization, it would reasonably be expected to have enacted a provision
similar to that in [the totalitarian and communist provision] of the Act.” 144
Second, the Board relied on the creation of a discretionary waiver of
TRIG, “for deserving aliens to avoid the consequences of the bar.”145
Specifically, the Board reasoned that “the inclusion of the waiver was a
means of balancing the harsh provisions of the material support bar and an
indication that Congress’s omission of ameliorative provisions in section
212(a)(3)(B) of the Act was intentional.”146 In other words, the waiver
theoretically functions hand in hand with the harshness and breadth of the
inadmissibility ground.
To understand the flexibility that exists in the context of terrorism
(and which is as yet lacking in the presumably more sympathetic asylum
context), it is important to examine how this waiver authority is exercised.
Within the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) has authority to grant waivers for material
support provided to Tier III terrorist organizations,147 and it may do so
either for situational reasons or for entire groups. Between 2006 and
September 2016, USCIS had granted 22,000 such waivers.148 The
142. Matter of A-C-M-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 303 (B.I.A. 2018). See generally John Flud, Duress and
the Material Support Bar in Asylum Law: Finding Equity in the Face of Harsh Results, 59 S. TEX. L.
REV. 537 (2018) (examining the purpose for the bar, and the ways in which the procedure is flawed
and leaves the waivers out of reach of many applicants).
143. Matter of M-H-Z-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 757 (B.I.A. 2016).
144. Id. at 761.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 762 (citing Matter of S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 941 (B.I.A. 2006)).
147. Defined at I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi).
148. Mica Rosenberg & Yeganeh Torbati, Trump Administration May Change Rules that Allow
Terror Victims to Immigrate to U.S., REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
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situational reasons focus on duress,149 which USCIS guidance defines
through a multi-factor analysis that largely tracks the definitions of duress
in domestic and international criminal law and in international refugee
law.150 The factors include whether someone “reasonably could have
avoided, or took steps to avoid” the action; the severity, imminence, and
likelihood of harm that was threatened; and how direct the threat was (was
it to the applicant, their family, or the community more generally).151
USCIS has also designated approximately twenty groups as being exempt
from these bars, ranging from the Oromo Liberation Front of Ethiopia to
the Iraqi National Congress (INC), Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).152
In immigration law, as in other areas of law, exceptions are more
powerful than waivers for at least two reasons. First, they remove someone
from the purview of a rule—the rule exists but does not apply to people
covered by an exception. Second, they work automatically—if they are not
included in the general rule, they do not need to engage in extra procedures
to justify themselves. That second difference matters profoundly to the
TRIG analysis because, while the duress waiver exists in the law, it is
granted only as a matter of discretion and individual grants are limited. 153
As Judge Droney wrote in a concurrence to Hernandez v. Sessions:
[T]he facts of this case, the nature of the discretionary waiver
process, and the limited public information available regarding the
waiver prevent me from concluding that the waiver system
necessarily complies with the Protocol; indeed, these issues leave
me with serious concerns that at least in some cases, the waiver

usa-immigration-terrorism-exceptions/trump-administration-may-change-rules-that-allow-terrorvictims-to-immigrate-to-u-s-idUSKBN17N13C [https://perma.cc/Z45F-U8XU].
149. Interoffice Memorandum from Jonathan Scharfen, Deputy Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs., to Assoc. Dirs. and Chief Couns., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., and Chief, Off. of Admin.
Appeals, Processing the Discretionary Exemption to the Inadmissibility Ground for Providing
Material Support to Certain Terrorists (May 24, 2007) [hereinafter USCIS Interoffice Memorandum],
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/MaterialSupport_24May07.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D25D-S33B].
150. See id. §§ I(B), (C).
151. USCIS Interoffice Memorandum, supra note 149, at 5.
152. Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds—Exemptions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/other-resources/terrorism-relatedinadmissibility-grounds-trig/terrorism-related-inadmissibility-grounds-exemptions [https://perma.cc/
RCJ3-4EZ3].
153. As of 2015, the total number of grants given since the program’s inception was
approximately 6,300 (USCIS did not provide data on how many were requested, so there is no
percentage approval rate available). USCIS Provides TRIG Statistics from 8/13/15 Meeting, AM.
IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N, https://www.aila.org/infonet/uscis-trig-statistics-from-08-13-15-meeting
[https://perma.cc/JP3G-ND52].
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system does not comply with our treaty obligations and
Congress’s intent to create an effective waiver system.154
Nonetheless, at least in theory, a waiver does exist for those swept
under the broad terrorism bars—a waiver that does not exist in the contexts
that follow.
5. Duress Debated: Denaturalization
Much of the remaining contest over the role of duress in immigration
law stems from the legacy of Fedorenko v. United States.155 Fedorenko
was an armed guard at the Treblinka Death Camp in Poland who came to
the United States as a refugee under the Displaced Persons Act (DPA).156
At that time, he failed to disclose his time at the Treblinka Camp.157
He later became a U.S. citizen, but when his work at Treblinka came to
light, the U.S. Government commenced denaturalization proceedings
because he had assisted the enemy in civilian persecutions, and under
section 2(a) of the DPA, he was ineligible to naturalize.158 In these
proceedings, Fedorenko admitted to his work at Treblinka and further
admitted to shooting at escaping inmates.159 But he claimed that his service
as a guard was coerced (the factual record on the level of coercion is
mixed, at best).160
The Supreme Court upheld the denaturalization and dismissed the
availability of a duress defense.161 The Court interpreted the DPA to reach
its conclusion that Congress had not meant to distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary assistance.162 In Fedorenko, the Court did not
hold that duress never mattered. Instead, it compared two side-by-side
provisions of the DPA to show that one omitted the word “voluntarily”
and the other used it. The Court writes:
Congress was perfectly capable of adopting a “voluntariness”
limitation where it felt that one was necessary is plain from
comparing § 2(a) with § 2(b), which excludes only those
154. Hernandez v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 2018) (Droney, J., concurring).
155. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). The Court, in Negusie v. Holder, 555
U.S. 514 (2009), declined to extend the holding in Fedorenko.
156. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 494–96; Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62
Stat. 1009 (1948).
157. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 496.
158. Id. at 497–98; Pub. L. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
159. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34.
160. Id. at 496.
161. Id. at 518.
162. Id. at 512 (“Under traditional principles of statutory construction, the deliberate omission
of the word ‘voluntary’ from § 2(a) compels the conclusion that the statute made all those who assisted
in the persecution of civilians ineligible for visas.”).
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individuals who “voluntarily assisted the enemy forces . . . in their
operations . . . .” Under traditional principles of statutory
construction, the deliberate omission of the word “voluntary”
from § 2(a) compels the conclusion that the statute made all those
who assisted in the persecution of civilians ineligible for visas.163
This decision has received criticism on its own merits as a
philosophical matter concerning moral responsibility. Shortly after the
decision was issued, lawyer Abbe Dienstag wrote that the Court “blindly
encountered-and blithely ignored-another issue of profoundly greater
moral consequence. The question of whether individuals are to be held
accountable for capital crimes committed under life-threatening
circumstances is one that has engaged legal scholars for centuries.”164
Moreover, Professor Stephen J. Massey adds, “Rather than openly
acknowledge that it was making a moral decision regarding the level of
moral responsibility necessary to find that an individual has met the legal
standard, the Court pretended that its conclusion was dictated by neutral
arguments of statutory construction.”165
Dienstag notes how this marked a dramatic divergence from prior
denaturalization (or “expatriation” law) where voluntariness had always
been a factor.166 Perhaps the Court itself recognized this implicitly, in
oft-quoted footnote 34,167 where it emphasized the need to focus “on
whether particular conduct can be considered assisting in the persecution
of civilians.”168 The Court immediately continues with this particularized
analysis of Fedorenko’s culpability, comparing him (unfavorably) to
someone whose conduct was much less grave:
Thus, an individual who did no more than cut the hair of female
inmates before they were executed cannot be found to have
assisted in the persecution of civilians. On the other hand, there
can be no question that a guard who was issued a uniform and
armed with a rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was
regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to visit a nearby
village, and who admitted to shooting at escaping inmates on
163. Id.
164. Abbe L. Dienstag, Fedorenko v. United States: War Crimes, the Defense of Duress, and
American Nationality Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 120, 130–31 (1982) (“The issue remains unsettled
though the weight of contemporary scholarship accords considerable sympathy to the accused in such
circumstances.”).
165. Massey, supra note 32, at 116.
166. Dienstag, supra note 164, at 134 n.49 (“Before Afroyim, the Supreme Court had long held
that in order to result in loss of citizenship the statutorily prescribed expatriating acts had to be
voluntarily performed.”).
167. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34.
168. Id.; see also Laufer, supra note 29, at 456–67; Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d 871, 880 (6th
Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the need for particularized analysis of conduct).
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orders from the commandant of the camp, fits within the statutory
language about persons who assisted in the persecution of
civilians. Other cases may present more difficult line-drawing
problems, but we need decide only this case.169
Once the BIA began applying the Fedorenko decision, the import of
this footnote faded, and the emphasis on case-by-case line drawing was
replaced with “a form of strict liability” in the assessment of Professor
Kate Evans.170 In Matter of Laipenieks, the Government was seeking to
deport a Latvian man who had joined the Nazis in 1941 to help identify
Communists in Communist-occupied Latvia.171 He interrogated suspected
Communists, and did not otherwise harm them, but he did know the
interrogations resulted in persecution for some of those identified as
Communists.172 “[The BIA] crafted a rule,” writes Evans, “that looks only
to the ‘objective effects’ of an individual’s actions, not his intent, level of
participation, ability to avoid harming others, nor even his knowledge of
the effect of his actions.”173
In her view, this strict liability is all the worse because her research
casts doubt on the correctness of Fedorenko as a historical matter.174
Professor Evans also shows that international legal history favors reading
a duress exception into the persecutor bar, even in the context of the DPA
and the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO)
whose provisions were adopted “wholesale” in the DPA.175 Specifically,
she explores the history of the provision and explains why one provision
references voluntariness, and not the other—simply put, voluntariness was
already presumed to be part of the meaning of “persecution,” but it needed
forceful articulation in the conscription context because the Soviet Union
and Eastern Bloc wanted recruits to be exempted from protection, that they
might be repatriated back to the Eastern Bloc:
Over the objections of the Eastern bloc countries, the word
“voluntarily” was used to ensure that conscripted soldiers and
prisoners of war would not be forced to return to their home
countries if they had political objections to the governments in
place after the war. In contrast, the term “persecution” had already
acquired a common meaning from its use in prior refugee
documents. The isolated use of the term “voluntarily” does not
reflect a policy choice to exclude all who assisted in the
169. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34.
170. Kate Evans, Drawing Lines Among the Persecuted, 101 MINN. L. REV. 453, 470–73 (2016).
171. Matter of Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433 (B.I.A. 1983).
172. Id. at 451–52.
173. Evans, supra note 170, at 470 (quoting Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 433).
174. Id. at 478–86.
175. Id. at 477.
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persecution of others from IRO coverage, regardless of
circumstance, because the term “persecution” already required
deliberate, intentional, and direct action.176
Moreover, in implementation of the IRO, the persecutor exclusion
did not apply to any person who claimed they were a victim of Nazis or
other fascist regimes.177 She concludes that “evidence of individual
innocence in the actions of the group was a defense and victims were not
considered persecutors. Consequently, the bar applied only to individuals
who took specific and direct action to cause the persecution of others or to
benefit from it.”178
Why does this World War II era statute, interpreted in the context of
a 1981 denaturalization case, matter? Because the Government invokes
Fedorenko as dispositive in the context of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.179 When a decision is based upon statutory interpretation, it is
necessarily limited to the statute in question. The Government’s sweeping
embrace of Fedorenko in relation to the INA is simply wrong, as the
Supreme Court eventually made clear in Negusie v. Holder, discussed in
the following section.180
B. Duress Unresolved: Bars to Asylum
1. Infirmities of Administrative Common Law in Immigration
Before turning to the current unresolved issues in asylum law, it is
vital to understand some unusual features of how administrative common
law is created in the immigration law context.181 Immigration judges, who
form the first line of interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act
and accompanying regulations, are administrative law judges within the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and they serve at the pleasure of the Attorney
General.182 The appeals body, the BIA, likewise sits within DOJ and is

176. Id. at 486.
177. Id. at 499.
178. Id. at 510.
179. Matter of Negusie, 28 I. & N. Dec. 120 (A.G. 2020); Brief for the Respondent at *8–10,
Negusie v. Mukasey, 552 U.S. 1255 (2008) (No. 07-499).
180. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 520 (2009).
181. The phenomenon of “administrative common law” has been well explored in the
scholarship. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 113 (1998); Henry J. Friendly, Book Review, Administrative Law Treatise (2d ed. Volumes 1 &
2). By Kenneth Culp Davis, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 471 (1980).
182. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (“The term ‘immigration judge’ means an attorney whom the
Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge within the Executive Office for Immigration
Review, qualified to conduct specified classes of proceedings, including a hearing under section 1229a
of this title. An immigration judge shall be subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties
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frequently the last court to review a decision.183 The vulnerability to
politicization shared by the immigration judge corps and the BIA is well
understood; scandals erupted during the George W. Bush
Administration184 and are simmering in 2020 as well.185 Writing on the
politicization of this administrative law agency, Professor Maureen
Sweeney adds that:
Sessions was not subtle in reminding judges and Board Members
that they served at his pleasure and were expected to implement
his decisions. In his certified decisions, he explicitly emphasized
the “extraordinary and pervasive role” that the Attorney General
has over immigration matters as “virtually unique” and the power
accorded him as “an unfettered grant of authority” including
“broad powers.”186
But even more critical for this issue is the unusual regulatory power
the Attorney General has to refer BIA decisions to him or herself.187
Should there be a decision from the BIA that the Attorney General
disagrees with, they may refer the case from the BIA to themselves for a
different result (or to offer different reasoning). This power is wellsettled,188 and has found a strong advocate in the Administrative

as the Attorney General shall prescribe, but shall not be employed by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.”).
183. This is partly because Congress narrowed the right to appeal to federal circuit courts in
1996, but it is also for at least two other reasons. First, there is no guarantee of a stay of removal during
the federal appellate process. Second, circuit court litigation is expensive and beyond the financial
abilities of many immigrants.
184. DOJ led an investigation into the politicized hiring practices done by, among others, Monica
Goodling. U.S. DEP’T JUST., AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY
MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 1 (2008),
https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1206586/download [https://perma.cc/HE4S-CJYH].
185. See Joel Rose, Senate Democrats Accuse Justice Department of Politicizing Immigration
Courts, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/13/805657208/senatedemocrats-accuse-justice-department-of-politicizing-immigration-courts
[https://perma.cc/TBT6JQQX]; Lorelei Laird, Whose Court Is This Anyway? Immigration Judges Accuse Executive Branch
of Politicizing Their Courts, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/immigration-judges-executive-politicizing-courts [https://perma.cc/HC8E-GQKH].
186. Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of Chevron in Refugee Act Cases,
71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 141 (2019) (quoting Attorney General Sessions opinion in Matter of A-B-, 27
I. & N. Dec. 316, 323–24 (A.G. 2018)).
187. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2020) (“The Board shall refer to the Attorney General for review
of its decision all cases that: (i) The Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him.”).
188. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits
to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 458 (2007).
Among the strongest defenses of agency head review were the 1992 Administrative
Conference recommendations on the federal administrative judiciary and the
comprehensive consultants’ report on which they were based. Both documents repeatedly
extolled the benefits of agency head review, portraying it as a way for agency heads to
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Conference of the United States.189 Professor Margaret Taylor describes
how the power conflicts with a familiar “core value of our legal system:
that disputes are resolved by an impartial adjudicator who has no interest
in the outcome.”190 Professor Taylor notes, however, that “[a]djudication
within executive branch agencies has long been a controversial exception
to this model.”191 In particular, Professor Legomsky, later General Counsel
to USCIS during the Obama Administration, has criticized the practice,
stating that it “entails the substitution of one person’s judgment for the
collective judgment of several adjudicators. And the probability that a
strong ideological bias will influence the result is greater when one person
is deciding.”192 Professor Legomsky prefers the restraint of rule-making to
the case-by-case power that referral permits, undermining the
independence of the immigration judges.193 More recently, Professor
Sweeney has pointed to this process as one of many reasons why such
decisions should receive extremely limited, if any, deference under
Chevron.194 She describes how, “as the head of the Justice Department, the
Attorney General has considerable power to influence the immigration
court system in a number of strikingly direct ways, from the bureaucratic
to the jurisprudential.”195 Professor Richard Frankel likewise takes issue
with the application of Chevron deference to such decisions, writing that
“Chevron deference should not apply because none of the three primary
justifications for Chevron deference—procedural formality, specialized
expertise, or democratic accountability—are present in Attorney General
immigration decisions.”196

assure inter-decisional consistency and to maintain control over basic policy at the same
time.
Id.
189. Recommendations and Statements of the Administrative Conference, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,759
(Dec. 29, 1992) (codified at 1 C.F.R. pts. 305, 310). However, that same document also states the
importance of independent administrative law judges: “The need for impartial factfinders in
administrative adjudications is evident. To ensure the acceptability of the process, some degree of
adjudicator independence is necessary in those adjudications involving some kind of hearing.” Id. at
61,760.
190. Margaret H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Adjudication: Attorney General Review of Board of
Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 18, 19 (2016).
191. Id.
192. Legomsky, supra note 188, at 461.
193. “These arguments are not generically compelling, however, and they seem especially
vulnerable in the asylum context. Inter-decisional consistency, while important for all the reasons
acknowledged in Part II of this Article, does not require the agency head’s intrusion into the
adjudicative process.” Id. at 458.
194. See Sweeney, supra note 186, at 136–46.
195. Id. at 138.
196. Richard Frankel, Deporting Chevron: Why the Attorney General’s Immigration Decisions
Should Not Receive Chevron Deference, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 547, 547–48 (2020).
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This power, which has been used at an unusually high rate during the
Trump Administration,197 is the reason for the current instability in the
state of the duress doctrine in asylum law, as the next section illustrates.
2. The Persecutor Bar: The Negusie Cases
The Refugee Convention198 and subsequent Protocol199 prohibit
states from returning people to countries where they face a well-founded
fear of persecution. This obligation, known as nonrefoulement, is a
minimal obligation and manifests in U.S. law as “withholding of
removal”: a promise of non-deportation, and nothing more.200 Asylum is a
more preferential status, as it places individuals on a path toward
citizenship which is more than the Refugee Convention requires. Because
it goes beyond the Convention’s minimum requirements, asylum status is
subject to certain limits and bars.201 It is discretionary relief,202 which
means that criminal convictions typically disqualify people from asylum;
applicants must apply for it within their first year in the United States; and
the law bars asylum for people who have committed serious nonpolitical
crimes or who have been persecutors of others.203 These last two bars to
asylum are also bars to withholding of removal; unfortunately, this is
where the availability of duress is utterly unresolved.
The Supreme Court took up this issue in Negusie v. Holder in
2009.204 Mr. Negusie, an Eritrean man, had been denied both asylum and
withholding of removal because of the persecutor bar. Negusie had been
197. As of October 2019, not quite three years into one term, Attorneys General certified cases
to themselves nine times (Sessions four times, and Barr five). By contrast, in two terms, the Bush
Administration did this sixteen times, the Obama Administration did so four times, and the Clinton
Administration three times. Adiel Kaplan, AG Barr Issues 2 Decisions Limiting Ways Immigrants Can
Fight Deportation, NBC (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/ag-barrissues-2-decisions-limiting-ways-immigrants-can-fight-n1073026 [https://perma.cc/RSR7-BS92].
198. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, ¶ 1, July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137.
199. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, ¶ 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 267.
200. INA § 241(b)(3); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(3)(A)–(E). For a comparison of asylum and
withholding of removal, see generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FACT SHEET: ASYLUM AND
WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL RELIEF CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE PROTECTIONS (2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/01/23/AsylumWithholdingCATProtectio
ns.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW4H-NPTB].
201. INA § 208(a)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2).
202. INA § 208(b)(1)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security or
the Attorney General may grant asylum . . . .” (emphasis added)); cf. INA § 241(b)(3);
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (“Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney General may not
remove an alien . . . .” (emphasis added)).
203. INA §§ 208(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(A)(ii),
(b)(2)(A)(iii).
204. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
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incarcerated and tortured by the Eritrean Government, and when released
after two years, they forced him to work for four years as a prison guard:
It is undisputed that the prisoners he guarded were being
persecuted on account of a protected ground—i.e., “race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” [Negusie] testified that he carried a gun, guarded the
gate to prevent escape, and kept prisoners from taking showers
and obtaining fresh air. He also guarded prisoners to make sure
they stayed in the sun, which he knew was a form of punishment.
He saw at least one man die after being in the sun for more than
two hours. [Negusie] testified that he had not shot at or directly
punished any prisoner and that he helped prisoners on various
occasions.205
In upholding the denial of asylum and withholding of removal, the
Board of Immigration Appeals relied upon the Fedorenko decision.206 The
Court questioned this reliance, noting that Fedorenko addressed “a
different statute enacted for a different purpose”207 and contrasted the DPA
at issue in Fedorenko with the Refugee Act.208 First, the Court looked at
the statutory language and found that unlike the DPA, this bar does not
mention voluntariness anywhere, so the statutory interpretation must
necessarily be different.209 Second, the Court contrasted the contexts and
purpose of the two laws:
Congress enacted the DPA in 1948 as part of an international
effort to address individuals who were forced to leave their
homelands during and after the Second World War. The DPA
excludes those who “voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since
the outbreak of the second world war,” as well as all who “assisted
the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries.” The
latter exclusion clause makes no reference to culpability . . . . The
persecutor bar in this case, by contrast, was enacted as part of the
Refugee Act of 1980. Unlike the DPA, which was enacted to
address not just the postwar refugee problem but also the
Holocaust and its horror, the Refugee Act was designed to provide
a general rule for the ongoing treatment of all refugees and
displaced persons.210

205. Id. at 515 (internal citations omitted).
206. Id. at 514.
207. Id. at 520.
208. Id. at 522–23.
209. Id. at 519.
210. Id. at 520 (internal citations omitted).
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The Court held that Fedorenko did not control interpretation of the
persecutor bar in the Refugee Act: “The BIA is not bound to apply the
Fedorenko rule that motive and intent are irrelevant to the persecutor bar
at issue in this case. Whether the statute permits such an interpretation
based on a different course of reasoning must be determined in the first
instance by the agency.”211
Applying Chevron deference, the Court remanded the case to the
BIA to do the required statutory interpretation.212 Nine years later, the BIA
issued its decision in Matter of Negusie.213 The BIA found that the implicit
duress exception is a permissible and desirable reading of the statute:
Recognizing a narrow duress exception is reasonable because it
fulfills the purposes of the persecutor bar and the overall purposes
of the Refugee Act. A narrow duress exception is also consistent
with the purposes and implementation of the Convention and
Protocol. And it is the best of the permissible approaches.214
In reaching this decision, the BIA applied the statutory interpretation
requested by the Supreme Court and gave particular weight to the
observation “that Congress enacted the Refugee Act to bring United States
law into conformity with the Convention and the Protocol.”215 After going
through extensive legislative history, the BIA also recognized “that
Congress intended that the persecutor bar be interpreted in a way that not
only comports with our obligations under Article 1F(a) of the Convention
but also reflects the international understanding of those obligations.”216
The BIA adopted a five-element test for the existence of duress that
an applicant needs to show by a preponderance of the evidence:
[T]hat he (1) acted under an imminent threat of death or serious
bodily injury to himself or others; (2) reasonably believed that the
threatened harm would be carried out unless he acted or refrained
from acting; (3) had no reasonable opportunity to escape or
otherwise frustrate the threat; (4) did not place himself in a
situation in which he knew or reasonably should have known that
he would likely be forced to act or refrain from acting; and (5)
knew or reasonably should have known that the harm he inflicted
was not greater than the threatened harm to himself or others. Only
if the applicant establishes each element by a preponderance of

211. Id. at 522–23.
212. Id. at 523–25.
213. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347 (B.I.A 2018).
214. Id. at 353.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 356.
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the evidence would it be appropriate to consider whether the
duress defense applies.217
This definition adheres closely to the versions established
internationally and in domestic criminal law, described in Part I. The only
addition here is the fourth element—the “assumption of the risk” principle
that some, but not all, U.S. circuits have adopted in the criminal setting. 218
Within the predictable range of duress definitions, it is at the narrower,
more restrictive end of those definitions but well within the range.
Shortly after the BIA issued its thoughtful decision, then-Attorney
General Sessions certified Negusie to himself in Matter of Negusie. As
expected, when the next Attorney General finally issued his decision in
2020, it reversed the Board, spinning an alternative interpretation wherein
statutes (like the DPA at issue in Fedorenko) play a far more compelling
role than international law.219 Future litigation is all but assured if this
Attorney General opinion endures past the Trump Administration.
3. Expanding Negusie to the Serious Nonpolitical Crimes Bar
The bar to asylum for those who have committed serious nonpolitical
crimes is distinct, of course, from the persecutor bar. Nonetheless, because
it exists within the same part of the same law (the Refugee Act of 1980),
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Negusie must apply equally—i.e.,
whether duress is a permissible consideration for this bar must be
addressed as a matter of statutory interpretation of this particular statute.220
As with the BIA’s decision in the remanded Negusie case, there are strong
grounds to argue that the statute does permit an implied duress
exception.221
These arguments benefit substantially from the traditional reliance
upon international law that is a core aspect of asylum jurisprudence in the
United States. Under the foundational Schooner Charming Betsy code of
statutory interpretation, formulated by Chief Justice John Marshall, “an act
217. Id. at 363.
218. See cases cited supra note 51 and accompanying text.
219. Matter of Negusie, 28 I. & N. Dec. 120 (A.G. 2020).
220. The Second Circuit adopted such reasoning in Nderere v. Holder, 467 F. App’x 56, 58–59
(2d Cir. 2012) (considering the “particularly serious crime” bar to withholding of removal).
221. Massey contrasts individual criminal culpability with the organizational behemoth required
for Nazi persecution.
The paradigm of criminal responsibility is the individual actor who has individually
harmed identifiable persons. Even when there is more than one actor and a differentiation
of roles between principals and accomplices, the number of individuals involved is usually
small. The harm the Nazis wrought, however, was of necessity accomplished by an
organized effort integrating the actions of many individuals who themselves occupied
different roles in a variety of organizations.
Massey, supra note 32, at 136.
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of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains.”222 Equally importantly,
Congress explicitly understood the Refugee Act of 1980 as comporting
with treaty obligations under the U.N. Refugee Convention, and the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.223 The BIA has
recognized this as well,224 while it is equally true that the influence is at
the persuasive and not binding level.225 As a result, U.S. refugee and
asylum case law is replete with examples of reliance upon international
interpretations of issues relating to the Refugee Convention and Refugee
Protocol, including the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR Handbook).226 In his
decision in the certified Negusie decision, Attorney General Barr
emphasizes the non-binding nature of such guidance, noting that “our
international agreements do not compel” particular interpretations,227 but
his view of how persuasive such agreements are is far from unanimous.
In one of the few cases to consider the serious nonpolitical crimes
bar, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[s]ince the only clear signal that can be
gleaned from the legislative history is that Congress intended the
nonpolitical crimes exception to withholding of deportation to be
consistent with the Convention and Protocol, we must look first to those
documents for guidance.”228 And the BIA itself noted in the Negusie
remand that“[c]ertain provisions of the Act obviously correspond to those
in the Convention because the language is the same. For example, the
‘serious nonpolitical crime’ provisions of sections 208(b)(2)(A)(iii) and
241(b)(3)(B)(iii) of the Act correspond to Article 1F(b) of the
222. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
223. See S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 4 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144 ( “[T]he
new definition will bring United States law into conformity with our international treaty obligations
under the . . . [Refugee Convention] which is incorporated by reference into United States law through
the Protocol”); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987) (“If one thing is clear from
the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one
of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the
[U.N. Refugee Protocol] . . . .”).
224. See, e.g., Matter of Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I. & N. Dec. 465, 468 (B.I.A. 1980) (“The
Conference Report which accompanied the final version of the Refugee Act of 1980 indicates that it
was Congress’ intent that the provisions of section 243(h) be construed consistently with the
Protocol.”).
225. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999) (“The U.N. Handbook may be a
useful interpretative aid, but it is not binding on the Attorney General, the BIA, or United States
courts.”).
226. See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439 (using the UNHCR Handbook to interpret the
definition of “refugee”); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 221 (B.I.A. 1985) (noting that the
UNHCR Handbook is a “useful tool” in interpreting the United States’ obligations).
227. Matter of Negusie, 28 I. & N. Dec. 120, 143 (A.G. 2020).
228. McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
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Convention.”229 The BIA in Negusie continued by writing that “Congress
intended that the persecutor bar be interpreted in a way that not only
comports with [its] obligations under Article 1F(a) of the Convention but
also reflects the international understanding of those obligations.” 230
As established in Part I.C, international refugee law resoundingly
recognizes the duress defense with only modest variations in the
limitations of the defense.
The clear existence of a duress defense in related contexts perhaps
explains the unstated analysis that has occurred around the serious
nonpolitical crimes bar to date. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged a possible
duress defense, although it declined to apply it in the case itself.
Urbina-Mejia v. Holder concerns a young Honduran man who joined a
gang after they beat him severely.231 As a gang member, he engaged in
extortion for the gang, which the immigration judge found to be a serious
nonpolitical crime, despite his claims of coercion. The BIA did consider
the claim of duress but agreed with the Immigration Judge who said he
had a “fair amount of autonomy,”232 making the duress argument
unpersuasive. The Sixth Circuit upheld that finding.233 As Professor
Marouf observes, “While Urbina-Mejia shows that the BIA and Sixth
Circuit were willing to consider an argument resembling a common law
duress defense, the decision makes no reference to the elements for
establishing duress and never mentions the common law.”234
Nonetheless, while it was a very light treatment of the defense, there
appears to have been shared agreement from the immigration judge level
up to the circuit court that the duress defense could exist, even if it failed
here as a factual matter.
The BIA also opened the door to a possible duress defense in
Matter of E-A-, again finding it inapplicable factually to the case before it.
Specifically, in E-A-, the applicant’s fears of harm were too speculative
for the defense to be persuasive: his “generalized fear is not sufficient to
show that he would have suffered any dire consequences.”235 While not
tying this analysis to a specific standard, the BIA was invoking two
elements of the widely accepted duress doctrine: that there be imminent
harm and that the consequences be akin to “an unlawful threat of imminent
death or serious bodily injury.”236
229. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347, 355 (B.I.A. 2018).
230. Id. at 356.
231. Urbina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 2010).
232. Id. at 363.
233. Id.
234. Marouf, supra note 33, at 189.
235. Matter of E-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 1, 8 (B.I.A. 2012).
236. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409 (1980).
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To the extent that duress is recognized in immigration case law, the
duress defense occurs at the third level of analysis—after other legal
findings are made. The first level is whether the crime rises to the level of
atrociousness needed to qualify as a serious nonpolitical crime.237
In INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, the Supreme Court supported the BIA’s test,
which balances the political aspects of a crime and its “common-law
character,”238 inquires about disproportionality between the two, and
“whether the acts are atrocious.”239 This focus on atrociousness, as
opposed to mere criminality, resonates with the seriousness that UNCHR
has articulated:
[Article 1F] excludes persons whose past criminal acts in another
jurisdiction are especially egregious. The “seriousness” of a crime
may depend on such factors as the extent of physical or property
harm it causes, and the type of penal sentence it attracts within the
particular legal system. Rape, homicide, armed robbery, and arson
are examples of offences which are likely to be considered serious
in most States.240
In other contexts, a related argument would be that the underlying
crime was political.241 However, this Article is concerned primarily
with acts committed under duress, not acts committed intentionally for
political reasons.
The second level of analysis is whether there are “serious reasons for
believing”242 a crime was committed. The Government has the burden to
prove a “probable cause” exists that the asylum-seeker committed a crime,
not that the asylum-seeker was convicted.243 The Government will
typically meet that burden through the applicant’s own answers to the
asylum application, which requests such information.244 The “serious
reason” language comes directly from the Refugee Convention, and its
intent was to ensure that asylum-seekers not be erroneously excluded from

237. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 422 (1999).
238. Id. at 416.
239. Id.
240. The Exclusion Clauses, supra note 77, ¶ 16.
241. Matter of McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 97–98 (B.I.A. 1984) (“In evaluating the political
nature of a crime, we consider it important that the political aspect of the offense outweigh its commonlaw character. This would not be the case if the crime is grossly out of proportion to the political
objective or if it involves acts of an atrocious nature.”).
242. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(B)(2)(a)(iii).
243. Matter of E-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (B.I.A. 2012).
244. Id.
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Convention coverage.245 The probable cause standard marks an area of
departure from the international standards, which are more protective.246
It is only at the third stage of analysis that a duress analysis would
exist—as a kind of waiver after a court finds that there are serious reasons
to consider that the bar applies. As the next section discusses, there are
sound reasons to consider duress in the first stage of analysis.
III. A NEW FRAMEWORK: TOWARD A UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE
DURESS DOCTRINE
This section of the Article provides a new framework for the duress
doctrine in immigration law. It will consider two possibilities for creating
uniformity: statutory solutions and judicial applications. The statutory
solution would create a duress standard common to all immigration cases,
positioning the duress analysis first in considering whether any
immigration consequences might exist. The judicial improvement in how
a judge’s familiarity with the elements of the five-part test for duress will
create a more uniform application and resolution of cases.
A. Statutory Solutions
The creakiness of the immigration statute is a well-known,
well-studied problem. The basic 1952 framework has absorbed, over the
decades, concern for Civil Rights 247 and asylum-seekers,248 and anxieties
about undocumented immigrants in the workplace,249 fraud,250 crime,251
245. “Although the application of the exclusion clause does not require a ‘determination of guilt’
in the criminal justice sense, and therefore, the standard of proof required would be less than ‘proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt’, [sic] it must be sufficiently high to ensure that refugees are not
erroneously excluded.” U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR STATEMENT ON ARTICLE 1F OF
THE 1951 CONVENTION 10 (2009) (emphasis added), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a5de2992.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7HPY-ZKXX].
246. Canada seeks “compelling and credible information,” and the United Kingdom seeks “clear
and credible” or “strong” evidence, requiring “the considered judgment of the decision-maker.”
Frances Webber, Exclusion from Refugee Status under Article 1F of the Convention, RIGHTS IN EXILE
PROGRAMME, http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/exclusion-refugee-status-under-article-1fconvention [https://perma.cc/GFD7-3Z2S] (citing Mugesera v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100 (Can.);
Al-Sirri v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2012] UKSC 54).
247. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
248. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 and 22 U.S.C.).
249. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
250. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
251. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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welfare,252 and terrorism.253 The experience of amending the INA has been
one of subject-by-subject changes with no conceptual overhaul.254
Beyond the incoherence that plagues the INA currently, the power of
the Attorney General to act independently of their own Board of
Immigration Appeals makes a more architecturally coherent law from
Congress vital. As it is, described in Part II.B, the Attorney General has
the unique power to resolve some of the most difficult and unsettled issues
in immigration law at their discretion. Professors Sweeney and Frankel
have compellingly argued that such decisions merit little or no deference
under Chevron, and litigation of certified decisions—including the newlyissued Negusie decision—may prove them right.255 But clear guidance
from Congress is preferable. To properly overhaul the INA and create a
uniform approach to immigration law, three statutory solutions are
necessary from Congress.
1. A Common Duress Standard
The standard for duress elaborated in the remanded Negusie decision
provides an excellent basis for testing how uniformity might work. That
five-part test fits well within the bounds of tests used in domestic criminal
law256 and in international refugee law.257 While the five-factor test forms
a relatively narrow understanding of the duress doctrine, the test is well
within the bounds of what jurisprudence across diverse fields has
developed. The standard would give adjudicators the ability to make caseby-case determinations about everything from trafficking to terrorism,
with clear guideposts, but with flexibility to avoid absurd results.
Returning to the introduction’s story, would Ana meet the Negusie
test for duress? For the first element, she acted under an imminent threat
of serious bodily injury to herself. For the second element, she reasonably
believed that threat would be carried out, because it had been carried out
before. She had no reasonable opportunity to escape, and her past attempts
at escape had failed, meeting the third element. She knew that carrying

252. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110. Stat. 2015.
253. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, tit. V, § 503, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified
6 U.S.C. § 101).
254. Congress came closest to such an overhaul in 2013, but the proposal for comprehensive
immigration reform only passed the Senate; House leadership never brought the bill to a vote. See
generally Elizabeth Keyes, Race and Immigration, Then and Now: How the Shift to “Worthiness”
Undermines the 1965 Immigration Law’s Civil Rights Goals, 57 HOW. L.J. 899, 915–24 (2014).
255. Sweeney, supra note 186; Frankel, supra note 196.
256. See supra Part I.B.
257. See supra Part I.C.2.

2021]

Duress in Immigration Law

351

drugs was not a greater harm than the harm she herself would experience,
which meets the fifth element.
The fourth element, “assumption of the risk,” places this test on the
narrower end of the duress doctrine, which is more challenging, and needs
more facts than were given in the introduction. Did Ana place herself in a
“situation in which [s]he knew or reasonably should have known that [s]he
would likely be forced to act?”258 In the real case upon which Ana’s is
based, she was very young when she first turned to the man who became
her abuser, and she did not know what she would have to do until years
into the experience. There is also room to argue that she did not so much
“place herself” as go to the only place she had to go once her family kicked
her out of the family home. Such a determination is highly contextual, but
as shown in the following section, is well within judges’ fact-finding
abilities. Ana thus might also meet even this narrower definition.
With that duress standard met, Ana could be eligible to apply for a T
visa, could qualify for the exception to the totalitarian party ground of
inadmissibility, and could plausibly seek a waiver under the material
support for terrorism ground. With a duress exception enshrined in asylum
law, Ana, and others like her, could qualify for asylum or, if failing as a
matter of discretion, could qualify for withholding of removal. However,
for the duress test to truly improve the INA, whether duress occurred must
be determined before analysis of whether a crime occurred.
2. Requiring that Duress Be Determined First
Clarifying the duress standard only goes so far toward improving the
existing incoherence with INA. Because duress is, at its heart, an analysis
of culpability, it must be part of any initial analysis of whether the ground
of inadmissibility, deportability, or bar to asylum applies at all.
The criminal legal system shows this well. In criminal law, the existence
of duress affects whether conduct is considered criminal in the first
place—it is a preliminary question that affects what charges may be
brought and what verdicts might be sustained. The doctrine does not
question the existence of undesirable conduct, but it determines the legal
significance of that conduct. As Part I.B showed, if a person kills another
while under duress, the charge drops from murder to manslaughter. For
lesser crimes, duress may negate required mens rea making convictions
impossible. If criminal conduct is found, duress also re-enters at the later
stage of mitigation, meaning someone might have two opportunities to
affect a legal outcome.259 In Ana’s story, the duress she experienced from
258. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347, 363 (B.I.A. 2018).
259. See supra Part I.B.
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her boyfriend would likely either preclude charges being filed, or reduce
those charges.
This same method of analysis is necessary when considering the
immigration, terrorism, and asylum context. Yet, for immigration law
purposes, there are only two places that have an analogous a priori
approach to duress. The first is in the use of the criminal legal system,
which identifies and funnels cases into the immigration removal system.260
If the case resolves favorably in the criminal system because of duress,
that person may no longer be removable at all.261 The second is in the
exception to the “membership in Communist and totalitarian parties”
ground of inadmissibility for those whose membership was under
duress;262 the existence of duress means that ground simply does not apply.
No further analysis, action, or waiver is required.
In the terrorism context, however, the law first considers whether
someone has supplied material support for terrorists, and only secondarily
concerns itself with duress through the discretionary waiver process.263
If duress recognizes a lack of culpability, why could it not be an exception
to the material support bar? The existence of an exception does not mean
that every adjudicator will find that duress exists—indeed, the strict
five-factor standard set by Negusie264 will be hard for many people to meet.
In so many of the criminal and international cases concerning duress,
the courts apply a test (whether the five-factor one, or something less
strict)—and find the person has not met the standard. However, treating
duress as an exception makes more conceptual sense as a normative
matter, since someone who can meet the standard should not be defined
first as a terrorist and then have that finding waived—they should not be
defined as a terrorist in the first instance.
Likewise, in asylum law, the concept of duress logically fits earlier,
in the threshold inquiry for deciding if someone has committed a serious
nonpolitical crime: the question of atrociousness of the asylum-seeker’s
260. This happens in two major ways. First, a crime could render someone “deportable” under
INA 237, and DHS initiates removal proceedings on that basis. Second, a crime could simply bring
someone to the attention of DHS through a complex interface of databases that notify DHS when a
noncitizen is arrested. See generally Detainers, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://www.ice.gov/detainers [https://perma.cc/9DE2-HLXA].
261. INA § 212(a)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) and INA § 237(a)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) detail
which convictions matter for immigration purposes; without a conviction, those sections would not
apply (although for some removability grounds, simply committing an offense is enough, absent a
conviction).
262. INA § 212(a)(3)(D)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(ii) (creating an exception for
“involuntary” membership).
263. INA § 212 (a)(3)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). The applicable waiver authority is found at
INA § 212(d)(3).
264. See Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347 (B.I.A. 2018).
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conduct.265 Conduct committed under duress is understood throughout all
the law discussed in Part I as making an individual less culpable than
conduct committed without duress, and culpability matters to a finding of
atrociousness.266 Contemplating duress at this initial stage might result in
a finding that conduct was not “atrocious”; this would mean there is no bar
to asylum at all, not that there is a bar that needs to be examined for the
existence of, perhaps, an exception.
Setting a uniform test for duress and making duress as an initial legal
inquiry are steps forward. However, clarifying the role of UNHRC
guidance in the course will ensure consistency between U.S. immigration
law and international immigration guidance.
3. Clarifying the Role of UNHCR Guidance
Because no law can anticipate all applications and future legal
questions, the ideal inclusion, in the law and not just (as at present) the
legislative history, would be a statement to the effect that guidance issued
by the UNHCR is presumed to be followed, unless there is a specific and
compelling reason to adopt a different interpretation. Such a standard
would respect the specialized expertise that UNHCR has in both
understanding the Convention’s provisions and history and monitoring
and guiding the development of interpretive caselaw worldwide.
B. Judges Can Do This
Ana’s story is one the judges have the ability to examine, understand,
and analyze, despite the anxiety that the Fedorenko Court267 expressed
about the challenges of line-drawing. While agreeing that duress begets
complicated decisions, the kinds of findings that the major tests require
are well within the capacities of the existing immigration court system,
and the alternative—the wrongful exclusion of people whose claims
should be found to merit protection—is too steep a cost to washing judicial
hands of the issue.
The elements of the five-part test for duress are actually quite
familiar to immigration adjudicators. Consider the question of “imminent”
threats of “death or serious bodily injury.” This is very close to the analysis
asylum officers and immigration judges routinely make concerning the
existence of persecution, which has a richly developed caselaw focused on
“deprivations of life and liberty.”268 Indeed, the standard is even more
265. See id. at 353.
266. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 430 (1999) (“In common usage, ‘atrocious’ suggests
a deed more culpable and aggravated than a serious one.”).
267. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
268. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985).
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complex in asylum adjudication, because the factfinder must examine the
motive before finding persecution exists. These factfinders must also
ascertain, often from the surrounding context of an applicant’s claim, how
real the threats of persecution are, whether the threatened conduct counts
as persecution269 and so forth. In Ana’s story, a judge could inquire into
why Ana thought the harm was likely to occur, and evidence of past abuse
would be helpful to that inquiry.
Likewise, another element of the definition is establishing that the
threat is “well-grounded,” meaning the fear is reasonable.270 This is
strikingly close to the core concept of a “well-founded fear” in
immigration law, basic to all asylum claims. The definition elucidated
through case law, just as with duress caselaw, focuses on the
reasonableness of the fear. The foundational case Matter of Mogharrabi
requires an applicant to show that a “reasonable person in his
circumstances would fear persecution.”271 In other words, such findings
are what immigration adjudicators do. In Ana’s case, the judge would
consider the plausibility of her account—do the kinds of abuse she
experienced happen in her country? With how much impunity? What
evidence concerning country conditions supports such a contention? All
of this is exactly what judges must already do in the asylum context.
Judges’ adjudicatory discretion remains profoundly important to this
issue.272 As noted above, the existence of the duress exception does not
mean that judges will find it exists in every case. A judge could find that
Ana did not undertake a reasonable opportunity to escape, or that the threat
was not imminent, and so forth. Judges retain significant interpretive
discretion, even in immigration law where discretion has narrowed
significantly over recent decades.273 To the extent there are concerns that
269. IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 730–43 (16th ed. 2018)
(providing summary of the wide variety of cases treating many different aspects of persecution).
270. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (stating that the defense of duress will only be made
available to a defendant if the defendant was coerced by force or threats of force which “a person of
reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist”); see also State v. Glidden, 487
A.2d 642, 645 (Me. 1985) (explaining that objective analysis requires two inquiries: the first being
whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would qualify an act as a threat, and second,
if the act is treated as a threat, whether a reasonable person in the circumstances have been prevented
from resisting to the pressures of the threat).
271. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (B.I.A. 1987).
272. Dan Kanstroom calls this “factual interpretive discretion.” Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding
the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703,
763–66 (1997).
273. See generally Philip L. Torrey, The Erosion of Judicial Discretion in Crime-Based Removal
Proceedings, 14-02 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (Feb. 2014). See also Kanstroom, supra note 272 (looking
at the interstitial qualities of decision-making); Elizabeth Keyes, Deferred Action: Considering What
Is Lost, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 129, 130 (2015) (“This kind of remedial, equitable discretion is a kind of
discretion that has been steadily whittled down over the past twenty-five years in immigration law.”).
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a duress exception will lead to errors, admitting people who are culpable
for offenses barred by the immigration law, adjudicators have the skill and
ability to serve as effective gatekeepers.
CONCLUSION
Immigration law has no coherent understanding of when and how the
duress doctrine applies. This state of the law leads to the same conduct
receiving wildly different treatment, which is not the hallmark of sound
jurisprudence. It also marks immigration law as an outlier, as other bodies
of law have developed robust interpretations of duress. The gaps are most
urgent in asylum law, which is—bewilderingly, given its protective
function—presently the least amenable to understanding how an
asylum-seeker’s conduct might be excused or mitigated by the existence
of duress. But this article has shown that even in its other applications,
immigration law’s treatment of duress is highly inconsistent.
Duress is a doctrine that has been developed equally in common law
jurisprudence, and in statutes and civil codes. If Congress does not act,
then judges are highly capable of administering an effective standard, as
shown by the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in the remanded
Matter of Negusie.274 However, a judicial approach suffers from the
special instability of immigration law in an era where Attorneys General
are aggressively using their powers of referral to undo the careful decisions
of their own administrative law judges. Those powers have been and will
continue to be critiqued, and perhaps the decisions flowing from these
political actions will be vulnerable if circuit courts decline—rightly, in this
article’s view—to extend deference to them under Chevron.
Until such time as the Attorney General power to undo immigration
common law is curtailed, however, a codification of the duress doctrine in
the immigration statute is gravely needed so that duress will be understood
in affecting whether particular bars and grounds of inadmissibility exist at
all—not whether those bars and grounds should be waived as a matter of
discretion. Congress must amend the nation’s immigration law to resolve
the absurd and contradictory results that flow from the current
disharmonies. Ana’s culpability for wrongdoing should be understood in
the context of duress, and U.S. immigration law should not hold her
coerced conduct against her. The might principle of the duress defense,
embraced throughout criminal and international law, must be enshrined in
the nation’s immigration law as well.

274. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347 (B.I.A. 2018).

